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[K]nowing the force and the actions of fire, water, air the stars, the
heavens, and all other bodies that surround us, just as distinctly as
we know the various skills of our craftsmen, we might be able, in
the same way, to use them for all the purposes for which they are
appropriate, and thus render ourselves, as it were, masters and
possessors of nature.
Rend Descartes, Discourse on Method, Part VI (1637)1
INTRODUCTION
From The Odyssey to The Tempest and beyond, the control and deliber-
ate manipulation of the weather constitutes an enduring and universal theme
in myth and literature.2 In the twenty-first century, it is scientists and engi-
neers rather than authors and artists who dream of weather and climate
control, and their story, as described by James Rodger Fleming, "is not, in
essence, a heroic saga about new scientific discoveries that can save the
planet, as many of the participants claim, but a tragicomedy of overreaching,
hubris, and self-delusion."' This notwithstanding, the argument that we
should deliberately manipulate earth systems and natural processes (referred
to as geoengineering) to mitigate the impact of inevitable climate change
has moved from the fringes to the mainstream of scientific and policy de-
bate. Almost as many scientific and policy papers have been published on
geoengineering during the last three years as in the preceding thirty years.
The 2009 Royal Society report entitled Geoengineering the Climate: Sci-
ence, Governance and Uncertainty4 provided the catalyst for a series of
government reports in both the United Kingdom' and the United States6 ex-
I. REN9 DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSO-
PHY 35 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Publ'g 3d ed. 1998) (1637 & 1641).
2. See Stephen H. Schneider, Geoengineering: Could-or Should-We Do It?, 33
CLIMATIC CHANGE 291, 291 (1996).
3. JAMES RODGER FLEMING, FIXING THE SKY: THE CHECKERED HISTORY OF WEATH-
ER AND CLIMATE CONTROL 2 (2010).
4. THE ROYAL Soc'Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND
UNCERTAINTY (2009) [hereinafter 2009 ROYAL SOCIETY REPORT ON GEOENGINEERING]
available at http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/RoyalSocietyContent/policy/publications/
2009/8693.pdf.
5. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE 5TH REPORT OF SESSION
2009-10: THE REGULATION OF GEOENGINEERING, 2010, Cm. 7936 (U.K.); SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE REGULATION OF GEOENGINEERING, 2009-10, H.C. 221, at 6
(U.K.); INNOVATION, UNIVERSITIES, SCIENCE AND SKILLS COMMITTEE, ENGINEERING: TURN-
ING IDEAS INTO REALITY: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE'S FOURTH REPORT,
2008-9, H.C. 759, at 11 (U.K.); INNOVATION, UNIVERSITIES, SCIENCE AND SKILLS COMMIT-
TEE, ENGINEERING: TURNING IDEAS INTO REALITY, 2008-9, H.C. 50-1,1 195 (U.K.).
6. See KELSI BRACMORT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 41371, GEOENGINEER-
ING: GOVERNANCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 2, n.1 1 (2011); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON Sa. &
TECH., 111TH CONG., ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: RESEARCH NEEDS AND STRATEGIES FOR
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ploring technological and governance issues associated with geoengineering
for climate change mitigation purposes, as well as focusing media attention
on these proposals. At the international level, geoengineering has reached
the agendas of the European Parliament,' as well as meetings of parties to
the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Convention8 and the 1992 Biodiversi-
ty Convention. 9 Noted in a mere paragraph in the 2007 Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report10 (and ig-
nored in the Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change
released by the British government in 2006"), geoengineering is slated for
serious consideration in a designated chapter in the IPCC's Fifth Assessment
Report due to be published in 2013-2014. In contrast to other climate
change mitigation measures-such as CO 2 sequestration-geoengineering
features regularly in the mainstream media and has provided the subject
matter for several popular science books. 12
That geoengineering has become a serious contender for inclusion with-
in the climate change mitigation toolbox is hardly surprising given the
context of the debate: the abject failure of states to reduce their emissions of
CO 2 and other greenhouse gases despite clear and increasingly irrefutable
evidence of actual and predicted serious environmental harm resulting from
climate change. Once framed as (simply) an environmental problem, climate
change today is as often as not explored through the lenses of morality,"
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION, at ii-iii (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter ENGINEERING THE
CLIMATE].
7. See Resolution on Developing a Common EU Position Ahead of the United Nations
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), P7_TA(2011)0430, 190 (Sept. 29, 2011)
("[The European Parliament] expresses its opposition to proposals for large scale geo-
engineering.").
8. See Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matter, Nov. 14, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 7 [hereinafter 1996 Protocol to the Lon-
don Convention]; infra Parts IH-IV.
9. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter
CBD]; see infra Parts Ill-IV.
10. Terry Barker et al., Mitigation from a Cross-Sectoral Perspective, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: WORKING GROUP Ill CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 619, 624-25 (Bert Metz et al. eds.,
2007).
11. NICHOLAS STERN, CABINET OFFICE-HM TREASURY, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW (2007).
12. See JEFF GOODELL, How TO COOL THE PLANET: GEOENGINEERING AND THE AU-
DACIOUS QUEST To FIx EARTH'S CLIMATE (2010); ELI KINTISCH, HACK THE PLANET:
SCIENCE'S BEST HOPE-OR WORST NIGHTMARE-FOR AVERTING CLIMATE CATASTROPHE
151, 171 (2010); ROBERT KUNZIG & WALLACE BROECKER, FIXING CLIMATE: THE STORY OF
CLIMATE SCIENCE AND How To STOP GLOBAL WARMING 84-85 (2009).
13. Jean-Frangois Mouhot, Past Connections and Present Similarities in Slave Owner-
ship and Fossil Fuel Usage, 105 CLIMATIC CHANGE 329, 329-30 (2011), controversially
compares the current attitude of most states and individuals toward fossil fuels with the atti-
tudes of slave owners in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For a response to this thesis,
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justice,14 or security.15 Some scientists and historians would go so far as to
assert that our (inadvertent) modification of the climate is so great as to war-
rant the end of the Holocene and the beginning of the Anthropocene.16 But
labels and metaphors represent more than a mere rhetorical device and are
by no means confined to the academe. The "climate as catastrophe" dis-
course, as developed by Mike Hulme, 7 creates a common or "global
enemy"" and, thus framed, permits the development of initiatives such as
the introduction of climate change as a topic for debate in the U.N. Security
Council in 2007.19 The securitization of climate change serves an important
function in recognizing its more diffuse impacts on the political and eco-
nomic stability of nations but, more pragmatically, also provides a
mechanism for demanding immediate attention from decision makers and
the mobilization of additional resources. 20 The declaration of "war" on cli-
mate change and the deployment of other military metaphors serves a
similar function and, moreover, can be used to justify more ambitious or
risky measures designed to defeat climate change. 2 1 While geoengineer-
ing-and its associated risks and other hazards (including moral hazard)-is
arguably ill suited to address the environmental impacts of a warmer cli-
mate, it is by no means clear that it cannot be justified in order to maintain
the security of states engaged in a war on climate change in the new era of
the Anthropocene.
see Joshua P. Howe, History and Climate: A Road Map to Humanistic Scholarship on Climate
Change, 105 CLIMATIC CHANGE 357, 357-58 (2011).
14. See PAUL G. HARRIS, WORLD ETHICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM INTERNATION-
AL To GLOBAL JUSTICE 74 (2010); Tim Hayward, Human Rights Versus Emissions Rights:
Climate Justice and the Equitable Distribution of Ecological Space, 21 ETHICS & INT'L AFF.
431, 432; ERIC POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 73 (2010).
15. See Michael T. Klare, Global Warming Battlefields: How Climate Change Threat-
ens Security, 106 CURRENT HisT. 355, 355-56 (2007); John Podesta & Peter Ogdon, The
Security Implications of Climate Change, WASH. Q., Winter 2007-08, at 115, 115-16.
16. See Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives,
369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SoC'Y (ser. A) 842, 843 (2011); infra notes 26-61 and ac-
companying text.
17. Mike Hulme, The Conquering of Climate: Discourses of Fear and Their Dissolu-
tion, 174 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 5, 7 (2008); see also MIKE HULME, WHY WE DISAGREE ABOUT
CLIMATE CHANGE: UNDERSTANDING CONTROVERSY, INACTION AND OPPORTUNITY 180
(2009).
18. Timothy Doyle & Sanjay Chaturvedi, Climate Territories: A Global Soul for the
Global South?, 15 GEOPOLITICS 516, 520 (2010).
19. Margaret Beckett, the then U.K. Foreign Secretary who chaired the debate in the
Security Council, argued that climate change affects "our collective security in a fragile and
increasingly interdependent world." Nicole Detraz & Michele M. Betsill, Climate Change and
Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts, 10 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 303, 303
(2009).
20. Id.
21. See Maurie J. Cohen, Is the UK Preparing for "War"? Military Metaphors, Per-
sonal Carbon Allowances, and Consumption Rationing in Historical Perspective, 104
CLIMATIC CHANGE 199, 207 (2011).
312 [Vol. 34:309
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Among scientists and in the popular media, there is a perception that
geoengineering currently operates in a regulatory Wild West. While there
are few (if any) binding instruments of explicit application to geoengineer-
ing,22 activities posing a serious risk to the global environment are subject to
the principles and obligations of international environmental law.
It is a matter of some debate whether a coherent discipline of interna-
tional environmental law exists as distinct from international law more
generally.23 The term-international environmental law-is commonly used
as shorthand to refer to the treaties, customs, and principles applied in the
context of environmental protection and conservation. 24 However, this Arti-
cle will argue that international environmental law not only refers to an area
of international regulation, but also comprises a distinct set of norms and
principles applicable to states in a situation where the global environment is
at risk of serious or irreversible harm. Geoengineering provides an ideal
case study through which to assess the extent and the limits of international
environmental law as a discipline: geoengineering creates a clear risk of se-
rious harm to the transboundary and global environment; it utilizes common
spaces such as the high seas, atmosphere, or outer space; and it has yet to be
addressed (with one limited exception) in any regulatory forum. This Article
argues that there are seven principles that impose obligations on states and
comprise the essential parameters of international environmental law and,
consequently, are applicable to geoengineering activities. The principles are
the prevention of harm; prevention of pollution; protection of vulnerable
ecosystems; the precautionary principle; principles associated with infor-
mation exchange, notification, and environmental impact assessment; the
principle of due regard for other users; and principles associated with re-
sponsibility and liability.
However, while these principles establish an essential framework within
which some control can be exercised over geoengineering activities, this Ar-
ticle recognizes the obvious limitations of international environmental law
as it currently stands. As a case study for exploring options for the future,
this Article critically assesses the regulatory regime currently being devel-
oped by the parties to the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention with
respect to scientific research on ocean iron fertilization and the extent to
which a precedent has been set for the regulation of other geoengineering
activities.25 In particular, the merits of developing an assessment frame-
work in order to facilitate fertilization research, without first providing a
forum for a broader discussion as to the policy and moral implications of
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 2 (3d ed.
2009).
24. See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAw (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010).
25. See infra Part IV.
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these activities, will be addressed. This Article will conclude with the de-
velopment of a proposal for a regulatory framework designed to govern
geoengineering in the Anthropocene.
1. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CREATION OF THE ANTHROPOCENE
The IPCC in its 2007 Fourth Assessment Report described the warming
of the climate system as "unequivocal." 26 Atmospheric concentrations of
CO2 have increased from 280 parts per million (ppm) in the 1700s, prior to
the onset of the Industrial Revolution, to 380 ppm in 2005.27 By 2008, at-
mospheric concentration of CO 2 had increased further to 385 ppm, higher
than at any point in the last eight hundred thousand years and potentially
higher than at any point in the last three to twenty million years. 28 At the
same time, land and ocean sinks, which play a valuable role in absorbing
CO 2, have weakened, 29 and it is estimated that the percentage of emissions
absorbed by these sinks has decreased from sixty to fifty-five percent over
the last fifty years.30 The predicted consequences of climate change-
including, but not limited to, warmer temperatures, rising sea levels, loss of
ice in the Antarctic and the Arctic, increased frequency of extreme-weather
events, and ocean acidification-have been well documented elsewhere.31
Despite agreement by 195 states to stabilize "greenhouse gas concentrations
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic in-
terference with the climate system" under Article 2 of the 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)32 and the
26. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 30, 72 (2008), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
reportlar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
27. Michael R. Raupach et al., Global and Regional Drivers ofAccelerating CO2 Emis-
sions, 104 PNAS 10,288, 10,288 (2007).
28. IAN ALLISON ET AL., THE COPENHAGEN DIAGNOSIS: UPDATING THE WORLD ON
THE LATEST CLIMATE SCIENCE 9 (2009), available at http://www.ccrc.unsw.edu.aul
Copenhagen/Copenhagen Diagnosis_- LOW.pdf.
29. Id. at 10; see also Dave Reay et al., Spring-Time for Sinks, 446 NATURE 727, 727-
28 (2007) (speculating that climate change may lead to the weakening of ocean sinks in the
future).
30. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 28, at 10.
31. See id. at 7, 15-36; Gerald A. Meehl et al., Global Climate Projections, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 747, 749-50 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007);
see also SECRETARIAT OF THE CBD, SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS OF THE IMPACTS OF OCEAN ACID-
IFICATION ON MARINE BIODIVERSITY 9, 16, 23-24, 28, 53 (CBD Technical Series No. 46,
2009), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-46-en.pdf (reporting on the
impact of climate change on ocean acidification and marine biodiversity); Scott C. Doney et
al., Ocean Acidification: A Critical Emerging Problem for the Oceans, OCEANOGRAPHY, Dec.
2009, at 16, 16-17 (discussing the effects of human CO2 emissions on increased ocean acidifi-
cation).
32. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107
[hereinafter 1992 UNFCCC]; Status of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/
314 [Vol. 34:309
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more specific targets applied to developed states under the 1997 Kyoto Pro-
tocol,"3 CO 2 emissions from fossil fuels were forty percent higher in 2008
than in 1990.34 In a business-as-usual scenario, it is predicted that tempera-
tures will rise between four and seven degrees Celsius by 2100."
The extent to which humankind has and is continuing to alter natural
processes and earth systems should arguably be categorized as a difference
in kind as opposed to simply degree when compared to the preindustrial era.
While attention has understandably focused on man's impact on the climate
and carbon cycle,36 humans have also significantly altered biogeochemical
cycles including nitrogen, phosphorus, and sulfur;" modified terrestrial eco-
systems through agriculture; transformed the freshwater cycle through
changes in river flow;38 increased the levels of CO2 and nitrogen in the
oceans; 39 and are in the process of driving what has been described as the
Sixth Extinction.4 In essence, "humankind has become a global geological
force in its own right.""
In 2000, Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoemer created the term "Anthropo-
cene" to describe a new geological epoch: an epoch dominated by humans.4 2
The date on which we moved from the Holocene to the Anthropocene re-
mains necessarily arbitrary. Paul Crutzen and Will Steffen suggest 1784, the
year James Watt invented the steam engine.43 William Ruddiman, on the
other hand, argues that the Anthropocene began five to eight thousand years
ago with the development of agriculture, the clear-cutting of forests, and the
cultivation of rice.' What is agreed upon is that the Anthropocene openly
ViewDetailsll.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg.no=XXVI-7&chapter-27&Temp=mtdsg3&lan
g=en (last visited Jan. 16, 2013) (listing 195 participant states).
33. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
34. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 28, at 7.
35. Id. at 49.
36. See Michael R. Raupach & Josep G. Canadell, Carbon and the Anthropocene, 2
CURRENT OPINION ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 210,210-18 (2010).
37. Steffen et al., supra note 16, at 843.
38. Id.
39. Toby Tyrrell, Anthropogenic Modification of the Oceans, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL Soc'Y (ser. A) 887, 887-89, 901-02 (2011).
40. Steffen et al., supra note 16, at 843. See generally RICHARD LEAKEY & ROGER
LEWIN, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: BIODIVERSITY AND ITS SURVIVAL (1996) (providing detailed
account of prior and ongoing events that the authors state may lead to the Sixth Extinction).
41. Steffen et al., supra note 16, at 843; see also Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene:
Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?, 36 AMBio 614, 614-21 (2007).
42. Paul Crutzen & Eugene F. Stoemer, The "Anthropocene," GLOBAL CHANGE
NEWSL. (Int'l Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, Stockholm, Swed.), May 2000, at 17-18.
43. Paul J. Crutzen & Will Steffen, How Long Have We Been in the Anthropocene Era?,
61 CLIMATIC CHANGE 251, 251-52 (2003).
44. William F. Ruddiman, The Anthropogenic Greenhouse Era Began Thousands of
Years Ago, 61 CLIMATIC CHANGE 261, 261 (2003); see also WILLIAM F. RUDDIMAN, PLOWS,
PLAGUES AND PETROLEUM: How HUMANS TOOK CONTROL OF THE CLIMATE 12 (2005).
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challenges the assumption "of an environment outside or separate from hu-
man existence" 45 and forces us to confront the fact that earth system
characteristics "are neither 'human' nor 'natural,' but are in fact highly inte-
grated composites of both."46 Geoengineering--defined as "the intentional
large-scale manipulation of the environment" 47 -is arguably the poster child
of the Anthropocene. Although there are individuals who challenge the no-
tion of a new geological era and question whether it is useful to formalize
the relationship between humankind and the environment in such a way,4 8
recognizing the Anthropocene serves a potentially important policy purpose:
it is as much about the future as the past.4 9 It challenges us to think more
critically about governance and law and forces us to ask whether interna-
tional environmental law is capable of responding to the challenges of the
Anthropocene.s0
The climate change regime, as it currently stands, is arguably ill suited
to respond to the environmental impacts of climate change, let alone the
greater challenges posed by the Anthropocene. The 1992 UNFCCC and the
1997 Kyoto Protocol together establish a framework designed to support a
reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases in order to stabilize "green-
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."" However,
David Victor has perspicaciously observed that "[t]he politics of actually
stopping global climate change by mitigating emissions are nasty, brutish
45. Simon Dalby, Anthropocene Geopolitics: Globalisation, Empire, Environment and
Critique, 1 GEOGRAPHY COMPASS 103, 111 (2007).
46. Brad Allenby, The Anthropocene As Media: Information Systems and the Creation
of the Human Earth, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 107, 110 (2008) (citing BRADEN ALLENBY,
RECONSTRUCTING EARTH: TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE AGE OF HUMANS
(2005)). This observation is perhaps no better illustrated by the creation of synthetic life. See
Daniel G. Gibson et al., Creation of a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically Synthesized
Genome, 328 SCIENCE 52, 52-56 (2010).
47. David W. Keith, Geoengineering the Climate: History and Prospect, 25 ANN. REV.
ENERGY & ENv'T 245, 247 (2000).
48. See, e.g., Jan Zalasiewicz et al., The Anthropocene: A New Epoch of Geological
Time?, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y (ser. A) 835, 837-38 (2011).
49. See Libby Robin & Will Steffen, History for the Anthropocene, 5 HisT. COMPASS
1694, 1699 (2007).
50. See Eva Lvbrand et al., Earth System Governmentality: Reflections on Science in
the Anthropocene, 19 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 7, 7 (2009). Few international lawyers have to
date begun incorporating notions of the Anthropocene into their analyses of environmental
governance. One notable exception is Davor Vidas in relation to the law of the sea. See Davor
Vidas, The Anthropocene and the International Law of the Sea, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL Soc'Y (ser. A) 909, 909 (2011); Davor Vidas, Responsibility for the Seas, in LAW,
TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE FOR OCEANS IN GLOBALISATION 3, 3-40 (Davor Vidas ed., 2010);
see also Rosemary Rayfuse, The Anthropocene: Autopoiesis and the Disingenuousness of the
Genuine Link: Addressing Enforcement Gaps in the Legal Regime for Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION: CURRENT
PRINCIPLES AND FRAMEWORKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 165, 165-68 (E.J. Molennar & A.G.
Oude Elferink eds., 2010).
51. 1992 UNFCCC, supra note 32, art. 2.
316 [Vol. 34:309
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and endless,"5 2 and the Kyoto Protocol has been criticized more specifically
for establishing an ineffective target for the reduction of emissions53 that is
not universally applied5 4 and will not, in any case, be achieved by the target
date of 2012.15 Although the parties to the Kyoto Protocol decided in 2011
to launch a process to develop a further protocol or another instrument with
legal force to provide for further emissions reductions, it is not envisaged
that this instrument will come into effect before 2020.56 In the meantime,
while the parties have formally recognized that action must be taken in or-
der to prevent an increase in the global temperature of more than two
degrees Celsius,57 only nine states in addition to the twenty-seven mem-
bers of the European Union have agreed to extend their commitments to
52. David G. Victor, On the Regulation of Geoengineering, 24 OXFORD REv. EcoN.
POL'Y 322, 323-24 (2008).
53. Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol calls for an aggregate reduction of five percent in
emissions below 1990 levels during the commitment period from 2008 to 2012. Kyoto Proto-
col, supra note 33, art. 3.
54. Only-developed-states listed in Annex I are bound by emissions targets as set
out in the Kyoto Protocol. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 33, art. 3. Dieter Helm has highlighted
the contradiction in devising an instrument that focuses on a reduction in the production rather
than the consumption of emissions while simultaneously excluding a large number of states
from those production targets. See Dieter Helm, Climate-Change Policy: Why Has So Little
Been Achieved?, 24 OXFORD REv. EcoN. POL'Y 211, 211-14 (2008).
55. For a critique of the climate change regime, see Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and
the Imperative of Enforcement, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 239, 239 (2008); Helm, supra
note 54, at 211-14; Rafael Leal-Arcas, Kyoto and the COPS: Lessons Learned and Looking
Ahead, HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 17, 17 (2010).
56. Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced
Action, in U.N. Climate Change Conference, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Report
of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventeenth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/
2011/9/Add.1, at 2 (Mar. 15, 2012).
57. The 2009 Copenhagen Accord stipulated:
To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas
concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the scientific view
that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius, on the
basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development, enhance our long-
term cooperative action to combat climate change. ... We agree that deep cuts in
global emissions are required according to science, and as documented by the IPCC
Fourth Assessment Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the
increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take action to meet this
objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity.
Copenhagen Accord, in U.N. Climate Change Conference, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19,
2009, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, '|[ 1-2, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2009/I /Add.1, at 5 (Mar. 30, 2010). This commitment was reiterated and rein-
forced at the Eighteenth Conference of the Parties in Cancun in 2010. See The Cancun
Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative
Action Under the Convention, in U.N. Climate Change Conference, Cancun, Mex., Nov. 29-
Dec. 10, 2010, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, at 2 (Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter The Cancun Agreements].
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reduce greenhouse gas emissions post-2012. 8 Given that the largest pollut-
ers (including China, the United States, India, Russia, and Japan59) have not
agreed to binding emissions targets post-2012, and Canada has announced
its formal withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol,6 0 the two-degree target ap-
pears ambitious at best and hopelessly idealistic at worst.' It is
consequently hardly surprising that individuals and-increasingly-states,
deeply concerned about the consequences of climate change, are beginning
to explore other mitigation strategies in combination with, or even as an al-
ternative to, emissions reductions. The most radical of those alternatives,
symbolic of the Anthropocene, is geoengineering.
II. GEOENGINEERING AS A CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION MEASURE
Changing technologies always seems easier than changing people
or challenging power
-Clive Hamilton, Requiem for a Species: Why We Resist
the Truth About Climate Change62
"Geoengineering" as a term of art was first coined and connected with
climate change mitigation by Cesare Marchetti in 1977.63 It is defined as
58. The thirty-six states have agreed to support an aggregate reduction in emissions by
twenty-five to forty percent below 1990 levels by 2020. The second commitment period will
begin in January 2013 and ends either in 2020 or in 2017 depending on a decision of the Ad Hoc
Working Group. Australia and New Zealand are prepared to consider submitting information on
emissions during this period but have not committed to reducing their emissions further. Can-
ada, Japan, and Russia have formally indicated that they will not be participating in the second
commitment period. See Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol at Its Sixteenth Session, in U.N.
Climate Change Conference, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Report of the Confer-
ence of the Parties Serving As the Meeting of the Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol on Its
Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/201 1/10/Add.1, at 2 (Mar. 15, 2012).
59. Information on individual country emissions can be found on the U.S. Energy In-
formation Administration's website. International Energy Statistics, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=90&pid-44&aid=8 (last
visited Jan. 16, 2013).
60. Statement by Minister Kent, ENv'T CAN. (Dec. 12, 2011), http://
www.ec.gc.caldefault.asp?lang=En&n=FFE36B6D-l &news=6B04014B-54FC-4739-B22C-
F9CD9A840800 (announcing Canada's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol).
61. It is worth noting that the two-degree-Celsius target itself has been challenged as an
arbitrary limit unsupported by science. See Chris Shaw, The Dangerous Limits of Dangerous
Limits: Climate Change and the Precautionary Principle, Soc. REV., Dec. 2010, at 103, 112.
For a more general criticism of approaches to defining "dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system," see generally Timothy M. Lenton et al., Tipping Elements in the
Earth's Climate System, 105 PNAS 1786 (2008); D. Moellendorf, A Normative Account of
Dangerous Climate Change, 108 CLIMATIC CHANGE 57 (2011).
62. CLIVE HAMILTON, REQUIEM FOR A SPECIEs: WHY WE RESIST THE TRUTH ABOUT
CLIMATE CHANGE 180 (2010).
63. See Cesare Marchetti, On Geoengineering and the C02 Problem, 1 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 59, 59 (1977).
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"the intentional large-scale manipulation of the environment"" and, as
David Keith has pointed out, both "[s]cale and intent play central roles in
the definition." 65 Consequently, while the origins of geoengineering un-
doubtedly lie in the weather modification of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, its scale sets it apart from those activities.6 6 Moreover, although
we have undoubtedly intervened in the climate on a large scale, this inter-
vention has thus far been unintentional or at least an indirect byproduct of
other activities. 67 In both scientific and popular contexts, the term geoengi-
neering has serious negative connotations, and it is unsurprising that climate
change mitigation measures such as reforestation, which constitute an inten-
tional large-scale manipulation of the environment, tend not to be classified
as such. As David Keith concludes, "we are moving down the continuum
toward acceptance of actions that have the character of geoengineering (as
defined here) though they no longer bear the name."6 Moreover, scientists,
policy makers, and other commentators have sought to distance their pro-
posals from "geoengineering" by employing terms such as "climate
engineering"69 or "climate remediation."70 However, these labels fail to cap-
ture the full spectrum of options under discussion, such as increasing the
alkalinity of the oceans in order to counter ocean acidification.7' Geoengi-
neering skeptics use similar rhetorical techniques and describe these options
in rather more inflammatory terms, such as "geopiracy" 72 or "planet hack-
ing."73
Geoengineering-in concept if not in name-was identified as a possi-
ble response (indeed the only response) to the deleterious impacts of climate
change in the first high-level government policy assessment of climate
change, presented to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965.74 But the
64. Keith, supra note 47, at 247.
65. Id.
66. FLEMING, supra note 3.
67. Brian P. Flannery et al., Geoengineering Climate, in ENGINEERING RESPONSE TO
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: PLANNING A RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 379, 381
(Robert G. Watts ed., 1997).
68. Keith, supra note 47, at 280.
69. See ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE, supra note 6; J. Eric Bickel & Lee Lane, Climate
Engineering, in SMART SOLUTIONS TO CLIMATE CHANGE: COMPARING COSTS AND BENEFITS
9 (Bjorn Lomborg ed., 2010).
70. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR.'S TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE REMEDIATION RESEARCH,
GEOENGINEERING: A NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESEARCH ON THE POTENTIAL EFFEC-
TIVENEss, FEASIBILITY, AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGIES 3
(2011).
71. See infra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
72. See ACTION GRP. ON EROSION TECH. & CONCENTRATION, GEOPIRACY: THE CASE
AGAINST GEOENGINEERING 1-2 (2010).
73. See KINTISCH, supra note 12, at 3.
74. Keith, supra note 47, at 254. The sole focus on engineering solutions to climate
change in this report is unsurprising given President Johnson's open support for science and
technology and his significant interest in weather modification both domestically and as an
instrument of foreign policy. See Ronald E. Doel & Kristine C. Harper, Prometheus
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modem debate on geoengineering was arguably initiated by a controversial
article published by Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen in 2006, advocating the in-
jection of sulfur into the stratosphere in order to reflect sunlight and thus
cool the planet. 5 Over the last five years a plethora of articles have been
published in serious scientific journals advocating and castigating geoengi-
neering options, 6 and, as a technological solution to climate change,
geoengineering has been explored in a series of high-profile reports pub-
lished by the Royal Society and the U.K. and U.S. governments."
Geoengineering's journey from the fringes to the mainstream of the
scientific and policy debate on climate change is in part a consequence of
the perceived failure of the climate change regime and the current policy
focusing on emissions reductions. 8 However, the attraction of geoengi-
neering also lies in the arguments of its proponents that these options are
"conceptually straightforward,"7 9 do not require the unpalatable but inevi-
table lifestyle changes associated with emissions reductions, and, most
significantly from a political perspective, are apparently economical. Scott
Barrett has described the economics of geoengineering as "incredible"; 0
moreover, Thomas C. Schelling argues that "the economics of geoengi-
neering compared with CO2 abatement . . . transforms the greenhouse issue
from an exceedingly complicated regulatory regime to a simple-not neces-
sarily easy, but simple-problem in international cost sharing."81 On the
other hand, research published to date has yet to prove the feasibility and ef-
fectiveness of geoengineering as a climate change mitigation measure," and
Unleashed: Science As a Diplomatic Weapon in the Lyndon B. Johnson Administration, 21
OSIRIs 66, 66 (2006).
75. Paul J. Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contri-
bution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma?, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 211, 211 (2006). This idea was
neither new nor Crutzen's own. Moreover, geoengineering as a climate change mitigation
measure had been explored in at least two U.S. official reports (in 1983 and 1992), see Keith,
supra note 47, at 255-56, and provided the subject for a (considerably less controversial)
symposium in Climatic Change a decade earlier in 1996, see Symposium, 33 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 275 (1996). However, Paul Crutzen was, and arguably remains, the most eminent se-
rious scientist to advocate geoengineering as a solution to climate change. For an entertaining
description of the controversy associated with the actual publication of Crutzen's 2006 article,
see KINTISCH, supra note 12, at 55-57.
76. See FLEMING, supra note 3, at 227; 2009 ROYAL SOCIETY REPORT ON GEOENGI-
NEERING, supra note 4, at 1.
77. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
78. See supra Part I.
79. Timothy A. Fox & Lee Chapman, Review: Engineering Geo-engineering, 18 ME-
TEOROLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1, 2 (2011).
80. Scott Barrett, The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering, 39 ENVTL. & RE-
SOURCE EcON. 45, 49 (2008).
81. Thomas C. Schelling, The Economic Diplomacy of Geoengineering, 33 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 303, 305 (1996).
82. For comparative assessments of various geoengineering options, see 2009 ROYAL
SOCIETY REPORT ON GEOENGINEERING, supra note 4, at ix, xi, xii; Philip W. Boyd, Commen-
tary, Ranking Geo-engineering Schemes, 1 NATURE GEOSCI. 722, 724 (2008); Fox &
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few proposals have been "demonstrated or costed."83 In a rare attempt to
quantify the direct, indirect, and transactional costs associated with geoen-
gineering, J. Eric Bickel and Lee Lane conclude that estimates at this stage
are "speculative."" David Victor notes that "the claim that geoengineering is
remarkably cheap is based on simple assessments of silver-bullet geoengi-
neering. In practice, however, the geoengineering cocktails that are likely to
be deployed will not be cheap."85 More importantly, the environmental im-
pacts of geoengineering-on the climate, the ozone layer, the oceans, the
hydrological cycle, and the terrestrial biosphere-are essentially unknown.
In contrast to emissions reductions, geoengineering relies to a much greater
extent on climate modeling,86 and the scope for controlled laboratory exper-
imentation is limited.87 In short, geoengineering could result in a "cure
worse than the disease."88
A. Geoengineering Techniques and Technologies
Geoengineering techniques 89 are divided into two categories: carbon di-
oxide removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM). Whereas
CDR techniques seek to reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases through the enhancement or manipulation of natural or artificial car-
bon sinks, including the oceans and the terrestrial biosphere, SRM is
designed to reduce the surface temperatures of the earth through albedo en-
hancement-increasing the reflectivity of the planet-or by redirecting solar
radiation away from the earth.
1. Carbon Dioxide Removal Techniques
The least controversial and most politically acceptable geoengineering
technique seeks to reduce atmospheric concentrations of CO2 through
afforestation and reforestation strategies. It is estimated that the world's
forest estate contains "roughly 3.9 billion [hectares] of forestland and 1
Chapman, supra note 79, at 2, 6; T.M. Lenton & N.E. Vaughan, The Radiative Forcing Poten-
tial of Different Climate Geoengineering Options, 9 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS
5539, 5539, 5556 (2009).
83. Fox & Chapman, supra note 79, at 6; accord Barrett, supra note 80, at 45-46.
84. Bickel & Lane, supra note 69, at 46; see also Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Climate Engi-
neering: Alternative Perspective, in SMART SOLUTIONS TO CLIMATE CHANGE: COMPARING
COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 69, at 52.
85. Victor, supra note 52, at 327.
86. H. Damon Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Transient Climate-Carbon Simulations of
Planetary Geoengineering, 104 PNAS 9949, 9953 (2007).
87. G. Bala, Problems with Geoengineering Schemes to Combat Climate Change, 96
CURRENT Sci. 41, 44 (2009).
88. Schneider, supra note 2, at 299.
89. For an overview of, and introduction to, geoengineering technologies, see Flannery
et al., supra note 67; Keith, supra note 47, at 247; Naomi E. Vaughan & Timothy M. Lenton,
A Review of Climate Geoengineering Pmposals, 109 CLIMATIC CHANGE 745, 745-48 (2011).
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trillion tons of CO2" and that deforestation contributes approximately
seventeen percent of global carbon emissions. 90 Although there are limits to
the effectiveness of this option-afforestation in temperate regions, for
example, is largely futile because the decrease in albedo as a consequence of
increased forest cover cancels out the additional sequestration of CO2-
many scientists argue that afforestation and reforestation are valuable
climate change mitigation measures.9' Massimo Tavoni, Brent Sohngen, and
Valentina Bosetti, for example, estimate that "forest sinks can contribute to
one-third of total abatement [of CO 2] by 2050."92 Often excluded from
popular conceptions of what constitutes geoengineering, the enhancement of
forest sinks is expressly recognized as counting toward a state's
commitment to reduce greenhouse gases in Article 3(3) of the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol.93 Decisions adopted at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in
Cancun (2010) and Durban (2011) created new incentives to reduce
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing
countries94 and have initiated a work program in order to facilitate a wider
range of land use, land-use change, and forestry activities to be considered
for eligibility under the Clean Development Mechanism.95 Other terrestrial
options not yet endorsed by the Kyoto Protocol include soil-carbon
sequestration (otherwise known as biochar), 96 the use of algae-which
naturally absorbs C0 2-on building surfaces, 97 and the capture and removal
of atmospheric CO2 by artificial "trees." 98
90. Brent Sohngen, Forestry Carbon Sequestration, in SMART SOLUTIONS TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: COMPARING COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 69, at 114, 114.
91. See Josep G. Canadell & Michael R. Raupach, Managing Forests for Climate
Change Mitigation, 320 SCIENCE 1456, 1456-57 (2008); Leonard Ornstein et al., Irrigated
Afforestation of the Sahara and Australian Outback to End Global Warming, 97 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 409, 410 (2009); Kenneth R. Richards & Carrie Stokes, A Review of Forest Carbon
Sequestration Cost Strategies: A Dozen Years of Researh, 63 CLIMATIC CHANGE 24, 25
(2004).
92. Massimo Tavoni, Brent Sohngen & Valentina Bosetti, Forestry and the Carbon
Market Response to Stabilize Climate, 35 ENERGY POL'Y 5346, 5346 (2007).
93. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 33, art. 3(3).
94. The Cancun Agreements, supra note 57, pt. M.C.
95. Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry, in U.N. Climate Change Conference,
Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving As
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on Its Seventh Session, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/201 1/10/Add.1, at 11 (Mar. 15, 2012).
96. See Raj K. Shrestha & Rattan Lal, Ecosystem Carbon Budgeting and Soil Carbon
Sequestration in Reclaimed Mine Soil, 32 ENV'T INT'L 781, 782 (2006).
97. See Eduardo Jacob-Lobes et al., Rates of C02 Removal by Aphanothece Microscop-
ic Ndigeli in Tubular Photobioreactors, 47 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING & PROCESSING 1365,
1372 (2008).
98. See K.S. Lackner, Capture of Carbon Dioxide from Ambient Air, EUR. PHYSICAL J.
SPECIAL Topics, Sept. 2009, at 93, 106. For an engaging introduction to "Lackner's Trees," see
KUNZIG & BROECKER, supra note 12, at 230-47.
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The oceans constitute the largest natural reservoir of carbon dioxide,
storing approximately twenty times more CO2 than the terrestrial biosphere,
and have accumulated almost a third of the anthropogenic CO2 emitted from
1750 to the present.99 Considerable and controversial research has been un-
dertaken over the last decade or so into how the drawdown of CO2 into the
oceans can be increased through an enhancement of the biological and solu-
bility pumps, which are key to transferring CO2 from the atmosphere to the
ocean's surface and ultimately to its depths. 10
Phytoplankton are essential to the effective operation of the biological
pump, but parts of the oceans such as the North and Equatorial Pacific and
the Southern Ocean are characterized by low plankton biomass owing to
missing key nutrients such as iron.'o This led scientist John Martin to
suggest in 1990 that the addition of iron dust to such infertile regions would
stimulate algal blooms, leading to an increased uptake in CO2 that would
ultimately be transported into the deep ocean and sequestered for hundreds
of years. 102 Thirteen small-scale iron fertilization experiments have been
carried out to date,10 and while all have enhanced the growth of
phytoplankton,10 the effectiveness of fertilization as a climate change
mitigation measure is yet unproven.' Infertility in the Southern Ocean and
99. SECRETARIAT OF THE CBD, SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS OF THE IMPACTS OF OCEAN
FERTILIZATION ON MARINE BIODIVERSITY 9 (CBD Technical Series No. 45, 2009)
[hereinafter CBD FERTILIZATION SYNTHESIS], available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/
publications/cbd-ts-45-en.pdf.
100. See MARK DENNY, HOW THE OCEAN WORKS: AN INTRODUCTION TO OCEANOGRA-
PHY 251 (2008).
101. See H.J.W. de Baar & P.W. Boyd, The Role of Iron in Plankton Ecology and Car-
bon Dioxide Transfer of the Global Oceans, in THE CHANGING OCEAN CARBON CYCLE: A
MIDTERM SYNTHESIS OF THE JOINT GLOBAL OCEAN FLUX STUDY 61, 107 (Roger B. Hansen
et al. eds., 2000); Robert A. Duce & Neil W. Tindale, Atmospheric Transport of Iron and Its
Deposition in the Ocean, 36 LIMNOLOGY & OCEANOGRAPHY 1715, 1715 (1991); T. John Hart,
On the Phytoplankton of the South-West Atlantic and the Bellingshausen Sea 1929-1931, 8
DISCOVERY REP. 3, 159, 186 (1934).
102. John H. Martin, Glacial-Interglacial CO2 Change: The Iron Hypothesis, 5
PALEOCEANOGRAPHY 1, 2, 8-10 (1990); see also P.W. Boyd et al., Mesoscale Iron Enrichment
Experiments 1993-2005: Synthesis and Future Directions, 315 SCIENCE 612, 612-17 (2007)
(discussing recent experiments where the Iron Hypothesis was applied in an attempt to in-
crease oceanic productivity); Nicolas Cassar et al., The Southern Ocean Biological Response
to Aeolian Iron Deposition, 317 SCIENCE 1067, 1067-70 (2007) (discussing more recent sci-
entific evidence that supports the Iron Hypothesis).
103. DOUG WALLACE ET AL., OCEAN FERTILIZATION: A SCIENTIFIC SUMMARY FOR POL-
ICY MAKERS 3 (2010).
104. R.S. Lampitt et al., Ocean Fertilization: A Potential Means of Geoengineering?,
366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y (ser. A) 3919, 3928 (2008).
105. For a discussion of the results of the key experiments to date, see Stdphane Blain et
al., Effect of Natural Iron Fertilization on Carbon Sequestration in the Southern Ocean, 446 NA-
TURE 1070, 1070 (2007); Philip Boyd et al., A Mesoscale Phytoplankton Bloom in the Polar
Southern Ocean Stimulated by Iron Fertilization, 407 NATURE 695, 695 (2000); Ken 0. Bues-
seler et al., The Effects of Iron Fertilization on Carbon Sequestration in the Southern Ocean,
304 SCIENCE 414, 414-17 (2004); Raymond T. Pollard et al., Southern Ocean Deep-Water
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Pacific regions may well be caused by factors other than a lack of iron,
including limited light,106 seasonality, oxygen production,107 grazing by
microzooplankton,"0 and the presence of invasive species.109 Moreover,
there is little evidence that any of the CO2 drawn down to the surface of the
ocean has actually been transported to, and sequestered within, the deep
ocean,"t0 and there are no agreed-upon means by which to verify any such
sequestration."' The biological and chemical responses to fertilization have
been described as "variable and difficult to predict,"ll 2 but possible effects
include increased ocean acidification, the disruption of marine
ecosystems," 3 eutrophication and anoxia,' 14 the creation of toxic harmful
algal blooms,"' the generation of an increase in the emission of other
Carbon Export Enhanced by Natural Iron Fertilization, 457 NATURE 577, 577 (2009); R.E.
Zeebe & D. Archer, Feasibility of Ocean Fertilization and Its Impact on Future Atmospheric
CO2 Levels, 32 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, May 2005, at 1-5.
106. See B. Greg Mitchell et al., Light Limitation of Phytoplankton Biomass and Macro-
nutrient Utilization in the Southern Ocean, 36 LIMNOLOGY & OCEANOGRAPHY 1662, 1662
(1991); see also Konstantin Zahariev et al., Preindustrial, Historical, and Fertilization Simula-
tions Using a Global Ocean Carbon Model with New Parameterizations or Iron Limitation,
Calcification and N2 Fixation, 77 PROGRESS OCEANOGRAPHY 56, 78 (2008) (describing how
light limitation decreases nutrient drawdown, which affects phytoplankton fertility).
107. See Tsung Hung Peng & Wallace S. Broecker, Factors Limiting the Reduction of
Atmospheric CO2 by Iron Fertilization, 36 LIMNOLOGY & OCEANOGRAPHY 1919, 1919-20(1991).
108. Francisco P. Chavez et al., Growth Rates, Grazing, Sinking, and Iron Limitation of
Equatorial Pacific Phytoplankton, 36 LIMNOLOGY & OCEANOGRAPHY 1816, 1816 (1991);
Bruce W. Frost, The Role of Grazing in Nutrient-Rich Areas of the Open Sea, 36 LIMNOLOGY
& OCEANOGRAPHY 1616, 1616 (1991).
109. John T. Lehman, Interacting Growth and Loss Rates: The Balance of Top-Down
and Bottom-Up Controls in Plankton Communities, 36 LIMNOLOGY & OCEANOGRAPHY 1546,
1546 (1991).
110. See Hein J.W. de Baar et al., Efficiency of Carbon Removal per Added Iron in
Ocean Iron Fertilization, 364 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 269, 270-71 (2008); Anand
Gnanadesikan & Irina Marinov, Export Is Not Enough: Nutrient Cycling and Carbon Seques-
tration, 364 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 289, 289 (2008).
111. See John J. Cullen & Phillip W. Boyd, Predicting and Verifying the Intended and
Unintended Consequences of Large-Scale Ocean Iron Fertilization, 364 MARINE ECOLOGY
PROGRESS SERIES 295, 296 (2008).
112. WALLACE ET AL., supra note 103, at 7. For an overview of the measured side effects
from the thirteen experiments to date, see CBD FERTILIZATION SYNTHESIS, supra note 99, at
23. V Smetacek and S.W.A. Naqvi, scientists involved in the controversial LohaFEX joint
German and Indian fertilization experiment in 2009, argue that the suggested side effects are
overstated and based on worst-case scenarios. See V Smetacek & S.W.A. Naqvi, The Next
Generation of Iron Fertilization Experiments in the Southern Ocean, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL SOC'Y (ser. A) 3947, 3947 (2008).
113. Aaron Strong et al., Ocean Fertilization: Time To Move On, 461 NATURE 347, 347
(2009); see also Kenneth L. Denman, Climate Change, Ocean Processes and Ocean Iron Fer-
tilization, 364 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 219, 223 (2008).
114. Lampitt et al., supra note 104, at 3930.
115. Charles G. Trick et al., Iron Enrichment Stimulates Toxic Diatom Production in
High-Nitrate, Low-Chlorophyll Areas, 107 PNAS 5887, 5887 (2010).
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greenhouse gases such as nitrous oxide,1 16 and a decrease in the
effectiveness of the Southern Ocean methyl bromide sink leading to a delay
in the recovery of the ozone layer.'17 Although research has concentrated on
iron fertilization to date, alternative options include the use of volcanic
ash,118 phosphate,119 and urea. 120 Furthermore, some scientists, including
James Lovelock and Chris Rapley, support the deployment of vertical ocean
pipes designed to pump nutrient-rich deep waters to the surface and to
effectively fertilize the oceans from the resources of their depths.' 1
An alternative or, possibly, an additional group of options are designed
to enhance the ocean's solubility pump, which transports carbon-rich cold
water into the deep ocean in areas of low temperature and high salinity.' 22
Cesare Marchetti, the originator of the term "geoengineering," suggested
adding carbon to existing down-welling currents in 1977.123 This is not
considered to be economically viable today,124 although the costs associated
with techniques designed to increase down-welling currents-including the
use of water, air, and ice-are almost as unattractive.125 More promising is
the option of increasing the alkalinity of the ocean through the addition of
limestone powder or soda ash.126 Known as weathering, this option purports
116. See C.S. Law, Predicting and Monitoring the Effects of Large-Scale Ocean Iron
Fertilization on Marine Trace Gas Emissions, 364 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 283,
284-86 (2008); see also Jed A. Fuhrman & Douglas G. Capone, Possible Biogeochemical
Consequences of Ocean Fertilization, 36 LIMNOLOGY & OCEANOGRAPHY 1951, 1954-57
(1991); Mark G. Lawrence, Side Effects of Oceanic Iron Fertilization, 297 SCIENCE 1993,
1993 (2002).
117. Oliver W. Wingenter et al., Changing Concentrations of CO, CI4, CsH8, CH3Br
CH3I, and Dimethyl Sulphide During the Southern Ocean Iron Enrichment Experiments, 101
PNAS 8537, 8540 (2004).
118. Svend Duggen et al., Subduction Zone Volcanic Ash Can Fertilize the Surface
Ocean and Stimulate Phytoplankton Gmwth: Evidence from Biogeochemical Experiments and
Satellite Data, 34 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, Jan. 2007, at 1-2.
119. See Lampitt et al., supra note 104, at 3923-24.
120. Julia Mayo-Ramsay, Envimnmental, Legal and Social Implications of Ocean Urea
Fertilization: Sulu Sea Example, 34 MARINE POL'Y 831, 831 (2010).
121. James E. Lovelock & Chris G. Rapley, Correspondence, Ocean Pipes Could Help
the Earth to Cure Itself, 449 NATURE 403 (2007); see also Andrew Yool et al., Low Efficiency
of Nutrient Translocation for Enhancing Oceanic Uptake of Carbon Dioxide, J. GEOPHYSICAL
RES., Aug. 21, 2009, at 1; Research Highlights, Ocean Beating, 463 NATURE 713, 713 (2010).
122. S. Zhou & P.C. Flynn, Geoengineering Downwelling Ocean Currents: A Cost As-
sessment, 71 CLIMATIC CHANGE 203, 204 (2005).
123. See Marchetti, supra note 63, at 59.
124. Zhou & Flynn, supra note 122, at 206.
125. Id. at 214; see also 2009 ROYAL SOCIETY REPORT ON GEOENGINEERING, supra note
4, at 20.
126. L.D.D. Harvey, Mitigating the Atmospheric CO2 Increase and Ocean Acidification
by Adding Limestone Powder to Upwelling Regions, J. GEOPHYSICAL RES., Apr. 23, 2008, at 1,
3, 15, 20. See generally Haroon S. Kheshgi, Sequestering Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide by
Increasing Ocean Alkalinity, 20 ENERGY 915, 915 (1995). An alternative method seeks to
increase alkalinity through electrochemical acceleration. See Kurt Zenz House et al.,
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to both increase the oceans' capacity to absorb, and thus reduce atmospheric
concentrations of, CO2 while simultaneously reducing the effects of ocean
acidification.127 However, as Jennie Stephens and David Keith point out,
"[lthe manipulation of ocean chemistry is controversial as the implications
and disruptions to marine systems are complex and potentially severe."1 28
2. Solar Radiation Management Techniques
SRM techniques seek to address the negative impacts of climate change
by lowering earth surface temperatures through increasing the planet's albe-
do or by deflecting solar radiation. It has been estimated that a deflection of
approximately 1.8% of solar radiation would offset the global mean temper-
ature effects of a doubling of atmospheric concentrations of CO2 .129
Techniques that are categorized as SRM include albedo enhancement of ur-
ban environments, natural environments, and the oceans; stratospheric
aerosol injections; marine cloud brightening; and the deflection of solar ra-
diation using strategically placed mirrors in space. Unlike CDR, SRM is
specifically designed to decouple atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases from the earth's surface temperatures. The consequences of such a
radical change in this relationship cannot be predicted.130 Moreover, while
SRM seeks to mitigate the impacts of surface-temperature increases result-
ing from climate change, it does not ameliorate ocean acidification. Finally,
SRM techniques do not address the causes of climate change-excessive
emissions of greenhouse gases-and consequently, should they prove un-
successful or be terminated for any reason, atmospheric concentrations of
CO 2 and other greenhouse gases-and global temperatures-are likely to be
significantly higher than prior to their deployment.
The only geoengineering option that is apparently risk free is urban al-
bedo enhancement: the utilization of white or reflective materials in urban
environments to reflect greater amounts of solar radiation and cool global
temperatures. '1' Unfortunately, although a whiter urban environment may
reduce local temperatures-and consequently energy use in warm cli-
matesl 32-urban albedo enhancement is capable of making only a negligible
Electrochemical Acceleration of Chemical Weathering As an Energetically Feasible Approach
to Mitigating Anthropogenic Climate Change, 41 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 8464, 8464 (2007).
127. Jennie C. Stephens & David W. Keith, Assessing Geochemical Carbon Manage-
ment, 90 CLIMATIC CHANGE 217, 222-23, 228 (2008).
128. Id. at 232.
129. Ken Caldeira & Lowell Wood, Global and Arctic Climate Engineering: Numerical
Model Studies, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'v (ser. A) 4039, 4040 (2008).
130. Matthews & Caldeira, supra note 86, at 9952.
131. See Hashem Akbari et al., Global Cooling: Increasing World-Wide Urban Albedos
to Offset CO2, 94 CLIMATIC CHANGE 275, 277 (2009); Robert M. Hamwey, Active Amplifica-
tion of the Terrestrial Albedo to Mitigate Climate Change: An Exploratory Study, 12
MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 419, 420-21 (2007).
132. See Fox & Chapman, supra note 79, at 4. An additional positive by-product of these
techniques is an improvement in local air quality. See Haider Taha, Urban Surface Modifica-
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contribution to lowering global temperatures.133 Similar reservations have
been expressed regarding proposals to enhance terrestrial albedo by increas-
ing grasslandsl3 4 or by selecting varieties of crops and trees that maximize
solar reflectivity."' Proposals to enhance ocean albedo are considerably less
well developed, and the potential negative environmental impacts of deploy-
ing floating reflectors 36 or the creation of microbubbles" would appear to
be potentially significant.138
Whitening the clouds-or more accurately, the stratosphere-with in-
jections of sulfate aerosols provided the subject for Paul Crutzen's 2006
article in the journal Climatic Change, which is credited with moving ge-
oengineering from the fringes to the mainstream of serious scientific
debate.139 Drawing on evidence from the Mount Pinatubo eruption in June
1991-which injected ten teragrams of sulfur into the atmosphere, enhanc-
ing solar radiation and apparently cooling surface temperatures by an
average of 0.5 degrees Celsius in 1992140-and research carried out by Rus-
sian scientist Mikhail Ivanovitch Budyko in the 1960s,141 Crutzen argued
that deliberate injections of sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere provide a
last-resort solution to drastic climate heating.142 Although the first field trial
took place in Russia in 2009 and was apparently successful,143 Crutzen and
tion As a Potential Ozone Air-Quality Improvement Strategy in California: A Mesoscale Mod-
elling Study, 127 BOUNDARY-LAYER METEOROLOGY 219, 220, 236-37 (2008).
133. 2009 ROYAL SOCIETY REPORT ON GEOENGINEERING, supra note 4, at 34.
134. See Hamwey, supra note 131, at 435-36.
135. See Andy Ridgwell et al., Tackling Regional Climate Change by Leaf Albedo Bio-
geoengineering, 19 CURRENT BIOLOGY 146, 149 (2009).
136. See generally Michael C. MacCracken, On the Possible Use of Geoengineering to
Moderate Specific Climate Change Impacts, 4 ENVTL. REs. LETTERS, Oct.-Dec. 2009, at 1.
137. Russell Seitz, Bright Water: Hydrosols, Water Conservation and Climate Change,
105 CLIMATIC CHANGE 365, 365 (2011).
138. See MacCracken, supra note 136, at 5; Seitz, supra note 137, at 376-78.
139. Crutzen, supra note 75, at 212.
140. Id.
141. FLEMING, supra note 3, at 236-37.
142. Crutzen, supra note 75, at 216; see Robert E. Dickinson, Climate Engineering: A
Review of Aerosol Approaches to Changing the Global Energy Balance, 33 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 279, 286 (1996); Philip J. Rasch et al., An Overview of Geoengineering of Climate
Using Stratospheric Sulphate Aerosols, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y (ser. A) 4007,
4033 (2008); Alan Robock et al., Regional Climate Responses to Geoengineering with Tropi-
cal and Arctic SO2 Injections, J. GEOPHYSICAL REs., Aug. 16, 2008, at 1; AF. Tuck et al., On
Geoengineering with Sulphate Aerosols in the Tropical Upper Troposphere and Lower Strato-
sphere, 90 CLIMATIC CHANGE 315, 328-29 (2008).
143. See Yu.A. Izrael et al., Field Experiment on Studying Solar Radiation Passing
Through Aerosol Layers, 34 Russ. METEROLOGY & HYDROLOGY 265, 272 (2009). A proposed
experiment to pump water a kilometer into the atmosphere in the United Kingdom as part of
the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) project in October 2011
was suspended owing to public opposition. See Sarah Fecht, U.K. Engineering Tests Delayed
Until Spring, Sa. AM. OBSERVATIONS BLOG (Oct. 7, 2011), http://blogs.
scientificamerican.com/observations/2011/10/07/geoengineering-tests-delayed-until-spring/;
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other supporters of stratospheric sulfate aerosol injections have been criti-
cized for failing to take into account different latitudinal and seasonal
patterns when predicting temperature responses. 1" Moreover, the injection
of sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere is highly likely to increase the deple-
tion of the ozone layer1 45 and has the potential to affect rainfall and
monsoon patterns with consequences for food and water supplies for people
in Africa and Asia. 146 The delivery of sulfate aerosols has been described as
a "formidable task" requiring millions of flights of a four-hour duration eve-
ry year, 147 and in a broader review of aerosol engineering, Goes, Tuana, and
Keller conclude that it is simply not economic as a climate change mitiga-
tion measure.148  Nevertheless, at the 2011 International Scientific
Conference on Problems of Adaptation to Climate Change 14 9-attended by
almost seven hundred delegates-stratospheric sulfate aerosol injection was
ranked as the preferred geoengineering option.1s0
The third-ranked option at the conference was marine cloud brighten-
ing.15' A significantly less risky option than aerosol engineering, marine
cloud brightening seeks to increase the albedo of low-level maritime clouds
through seeding those clouds with salt. 5 2 Although Salter, Sortino, and Lat-
ham have developed a design for wind-driven, remotely controlled spray
vessels for the purpose of delivering salt to low-level maritime clouds, 153 it
is unclear how many such vessels would be required and whether this over-
all technology would, in any case, be effective. 154
Sarah Fecht, U.K. Researchers to Test "Artificial Volcano" for Geoengineering the Climate,
Sci. AM. (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=uk-researchers-
to-test-artificial-volcano-for-geoengineering-the-climate.
144. See Michael C. MacCracken, Geoengineering: Worthy of Cautious Evaluation?, 77
CLIMATIC CHANGE 235, 240 (2006).
145. Simone Tilmes et al., The Sensitivity of Polar Ozone Depletion to Proposed Geoen-
gineering Schemes, 320 SCIENCE 1201, 1204 (2008); see Rasch et al., supra note 142, at 4031.
146. Robock et al., supra note 142, at 1.
147. Rasch et al., supra note 142, at 4030-31.
148. Marlos Goes, Nancy Tuana & Klaus Keller, The Economics (or Lack Thereof) of
Aerosol Geoengineering, 109 CLIMATIC CHANGE 719, 720 (2011).
149. Sponsored by the Russian Academy of Sciences together with the World Meteoro-
logical Association, the U.N. Environment Programme, and the U.N. Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization.
150. See A. Frolov, Summary of the Chairman of the International Scientific Confer-
ence: "Problems of Adaptation to Climate Change" (Nov. 7-9, 2011) (on file with author).
151. See id.
152. John Latham et al., Global Temperature Stabilization via Contrlled Albedo En-
hancement of Low-Level Maritime Clouds, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y (ser. A)
3969, 3969 (2008); see Crutzen, supra note 75, at 211-12.
153. Stephen Salter, Graham Sortino & John Latham, Sea-Going Hardware for the
Cloud Albedo Method of Reversing Global Warming, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONs ROYAL Soc'Y
(ser. A) 3989, 3989 (2008).
154. Latham et al., supra note 152, at 3984-85.
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The final group of options might be derived directly from science fic-
tion: the deflection of solar radiation using space mirrors, so-called
sunshade geoengineering.'15 Options include the placement of mirrors or
sunshade discs between the earth and the sun or in orbit around the earth."'6
Other options include an artificial equatorial ring of passive particles' or
the deployment of a "cloud" of reflective spacecraft.' Although technically
feasible,'59 the known and unknown risks are significant: overcompensation
could lead to excessive global cooling, and a large number of orbiting ob-
jects is likely to result in high quantities of space debris. In any case, the
economics of space-based geoengineering are not viable,160 with the U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Space and Technology recently
noting that "due to high projected costs, technological infeasibility and un-
acceptable environmental and political risks, the solar radiation management
... strategy of space-based mirrors should be a low priority consideration
for research."''
III. THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FOR GEOENGINEERING
With three or four notable exceptions, geoengineering has yet to capture
the attention of international lawyers.162 Indeed, the application of
155. See D.J. Lunt et al., Sunshade World: A Fully Coupled CGM Evaluation of the Cli-
matic Impacts of Geoengineering, 35 GEOPHYSICAL REs. LETTERS, June 2008, at 1.
156. Takanobu Kosugi, Role of Sunshades in Space As a Climate Control Option, 67
ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 241, 242 (2010); see also James T. Early, Space-Based Solar Shield to
Offset Greenhouse Effect, 42 J. BRIT. INTERPLANETARY Soc'Y 567, 567 (1989); C.R. McIn-
nes, Space-Based Geoengineering: Challenges and Requirements, 224 J. MECHANICAL
ENGINEERING Sa. 571, 573 (2010).
157. Jerome Pearson et al., Earth Rings for Planetary Environment Control, 58 ACTA
ASTRONAUTICA 44, 46 (2006). However, while this option would cool the tropics, it might also
warm high-latitude regions. Lunt et al., supra note 155, at 1.
158. Roger Angel, Feasibility of Cooling the Earth with a Cloud of Small Spacecraft
Near the Inner Legrange Point (LI), 103 PNAS 17,184, 17,184 (2006).
159. See Kosugi, supra note 156, at 243.
160. Id.
161. ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE, supra note 6, at 42.
162. See Daniel Bodansky, May We Engineer the Climate?, 33 CLIMATIC CHANGE 309
(1996); William C.G. Bums, Climate Geoengineering: Solar Radiation Management and Its
Implications for Intergenerational Equity, 4 STAN. J.L. SCI. & POL'Y 38, 38 (2011); Victor,
supra note 52, at 322; John Virgoe, International Governance of a Possible Geoengineering
Intervention to Combat Climate Change, 95 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103, 103 (2009); see also
Alan Carlin, Global Climate Change Control: Is There a Better Strategy than Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1401, 1401 (2007); William Daniel Davis,
What Does "Green" Mean? Anthropogenic Climate Change, Geoengineering and Interna-
tional Envimnmental Law, 43 GA. L. REv. 901, 950 (2009); Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering:
A Climate Change Manhattan Project, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 73, 139 (1998). Ocean fertiliza-
tion and the law of the sea has benefited from rather more in-depth discussion. See infra notes
283-284 and accompanying text.
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international law to geoengineering tends to be treated dismissively or, in
the words of John Virgoe, as an "aside." 63 With the exception of
reforestation and afforestation'" and ocean fertilization for scientific
research purposes,165 there are few legal instruments explicitly applicable to
geoengineering; however, as an activity that creates a significant risk of
serious harm to the environment, geoengineering is subject to the
obligations and principles of international environmental law more
generally. In fact, geoengineering provides an ideal case study to prove the
extent, limits, and the very existence of international environmental law as a
coherent discipline distinct from, albeit part of, international law more
generally. Seven principles or (in two cases) categories of principles
comprise the basic parameters of international environmental law and
impose obligations on states: the prevention of harm; the prevention of
pollution; the obligation to protect vulnerable ecosystems and species; the
precautionary principle; principles of cooperation, information exchange,
and environmental impact assessment; the principle of due regard for other
users; and the principle of state responsibility. These principles are derived
from an aggregate of customary and treaty obligations and are sufficiently
extensive in their scope and nature of application to constrain at least some
of the proposed techniques of geoengineering. In many cases, individual
states are subject to a greater level of constraint owing to the application of
more specific treaty commitments. Although far from perfect,166 the
applicability of international environmental law as a discipline to activities
creating a significant risk of serious environmental harm proves that
geoengineering does not take place in a regulatory Wild West or a legal
black hole.
A. Specialized Rules Applicable to Geoengineering
Although geoengineering solutions are being designed for the purpose
of climate change mitigation, these technologies-with the exception of re-
forestation and afforestation-are not specifically addressed by the 1992
UNFCCC or the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The ultimate goal of the climate
change regime, the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system," 67 does not prima facie preclude the
deployment of CDR technologies, although it would appear to be incompat-
ible with SRM techniques that do not seek to reduce atmospheric
concentrations of CO2. Both the 1992 UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto Proto-
163. Virgoe, supra note 162, at 109.
164. This issue warrants additional discussion but, for the sake of concision, is not con-
sidered in this Article.
165. See infra text accompanying notes 176, 284-287.
166. See discussion infra Part V (discussing limits of current regime and peculiar chal-
lenges associated with geoengineering).
167. 1992 UNFCCC, supra note 32, art. 2.
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col call on parties to promote the enhancement of CO2 sinks and reservoirs
including biomass, forests, and oceans,"'s but at this stage, only afforestation
and reforestation can be used in the calculation of a state's greenhouse gas
emissions. 169 The Kyoto Protocol calls on states to promote research into
and use of "advanced and innovative environmentally sound technolo-
gies," 70 but the qualification embedded within that same article would
exclude many geoengineering technologies that are demonstrably environ-
mentally unsound.
The 1976 U.N. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (the ENMOD Con-
vention)"' is probably the instrument most closely related to geoengineering
in terms of subject matter. However, although the definition of "environmen-
tal modification" under Article II of the ENMOD Convention is undoubtedly
broad enough to include geoengineering,172 Article I of ENMOD limits the
prohibition of environmental modification to situations where it is used for
military or hostile purposes. 73 Moreover, Article 1(1) of the ENMOD Con-
vention stipulates that "[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not hinder the
use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes and shall
168. Id. art. 4(d); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 33, art. 2(l)(a)(ii).
169. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 33, art. 3(3).
170. Id. art. 2(1)(a)(iv).
171. 1976 U.N. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, opened for signature May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333,
1108 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter 1976 ENMOD Convention]. See generally Jozef Goldblat, The
Environmental Modification Convention of 1977: An Analysis, in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE:
A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY APPRAISAL 53, 53-56, 58 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984)
(discussing the scope of the 1976 ENMOD Convention).
172. Article II of the 1976 ENMOD Convention defines "environmental modification
techniques" as "any technique for changing-through the deliberate manipulation of natural
processes-the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, litho-
sphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space." 1976 ENMOD Convention, supra
note 171, art. II. By contrast, the definition of "weather modification" in the 1980 U.N. Envi-
ronment Program guidelines entitled Provisions for Co-operation Between States in Weather
Modification (Decision 8/7) focuses on activities designed to change the patterns of rainfall,
cloud coverage, and fog that are on too small a scale to be categorized as geoengineering. See
U.N. Env't Program Governing Council, Provisions for Co-operation Between States in
Weather Modification, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/8/7/A (Apr. 29, 1980).
173. 1976 ENMOD Convention, supra note 171, art. II. Interestingly, earlier drafts of
ENMOD had a broader application and sought to outlaw environmental modification, includ-
ing climate modification, for military and other purposes incompatible with the "maintenance
of international security, human well being and health." Lawrence Juda, Negotiating a Treaty
on Environmental Modification Warfare: The Convention on Environmental Warfare and Its
Impact on Arms Control Negotiations, 32 INT'L ORG. 975, 978 (1978) (quoting First
Comm. of the Gen. Assembly, Draft Resolution on the Prohibition of Action to Influence
the Environment and Climate for Military and Other Purposes Incompatible with the
Maintenance of International Security, Human Well-Being and Health, Submitted by Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.675 (Sept. 24, 1974)). This earlier draft was
developed by the then Soviet Union but narrowed at the behest of the United States. See id. at
979.
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be without prejudice to the generally recognized principles and applicable
rules of international law concerning such use."' 74 The ENMOD Convention
does set out a number of obligations relating to cooperation and notification
applicable to the seventy-six state parties."
More specifically, the states party to the 1992 Biodiversity Convention
adopted Decision X/33 in 2010, calling on states to
[e]nsure . .. in the absence of science based, global, transparent and
effective control and regulatory mechanisms for geo-engineering,
and in accordance with the precautionary approach and Article 14
of the Convention, that no climate-related geo-engineering activi-
ties that may affect biodiversity take place, until there is an
adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities and ap-
propriate consideration of the associated risks for the environment
and biodiversity and associated social, economic and cultural im-
pacts, with the exception of small scale scientific research studies
that would be conducted in a controlled setting in accordance with
Article 3 of the Convention, and only if they are justified by the
need to gather specific scientific data and are subject to a thorough
prior assessment of the potential impacts on the environment.17 6
Sometimes incorrectly referred to as establishing a moratorium, this Deci-
sion, while persuasive, is not legally binding. Decision IX/16, which was
adopted by the parties to the Biodiversity Convention in 2008, called on par-
ties
to ensure that ocean fertilization activities do not take place until
there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activi-
ties, including assessing associated risks, and a global, transparent
and effective control and regulatory mechanism is in place for these
activities; with the exception of small scale scientific research stud-
ies within coastal waters. 77
The decision is similarly nonbinding and, moreover, uses only hortatory
language. Also in 2008, the parties to the 1972 London Convention and Pro-
tocol adopted mandatory terminology in Resolution LC-LP.1, which
declares ocean fertilization activities other than legitimate scientific research
to be contrary to the aims of both instruments.17 Despite the language, how-
174. 1976 ENMOD Convention, supra note 171, art. E11(1).
175. See discussion infra Part LH.F.
176. Conference of the Parties to the CBD at Its Tenth Meeting, Nagoya, Japan, Oct. 18-
29, 2010, X/33 Biodiversity and Climate Change, 8(w), UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/33 (Oct.
29, 2010).
177. Conference of the Parties to the CBD at Its Ninth Meeting, Bonn, Ger., May 19-20,
2008, IX/16 Biodiversity and Climate Change, I C.4, UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 (Oct. 9, 2008).
178. London Convention and Protocol [LC-LP], Resolution LC-LP(2008) on the Regu-
lation of Ocean Fertilization, 8, LC 30/16 (Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter LC-LP Resolution
LC-LP.1 (2008)].
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ever, the resolution itself is not legally binding.179 However, these instru-
ments are highly persuasive and, moreover, rely on more general principles
of international environmental law that are independently binding and ap-
plicable to all states.
B. The Obligation to Prevent Harm
International environmental law is arguably founded on the obligation
to ensure that activities within the jurisdiction or under the control of a
state do not cause harm to the environment of other states or to areas be-
yond national jurisdiction. The no-harm principle forms "part of the
corpus of international law," which has been confirmed by the Internation-
al Court of Justice (ICJ) on several occasions.s 0 This principle is central to
a number of declarations of principles relating to the environment, including
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,"' the 1992 Rio Declaration,182 and the
2001 International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Transboundary
Harm.'83 Moreover, this principle has been incorporated into and confirmed
by a number of environmental treaties of general application. Of particular
relevance to marine-focused geoengineering are Articles 192 and 193 of the
1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), which impose a gen-
eral obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment and operate
as constraints on activities such as ocean fertilization or weathering where
there is a significant risk of environmental harm.'84 It is worth noting that
the obligation to prevent harm to the marine environment under Part XII of
the LOSC also applies to scientific research activities according to Part XIII
of the Convention."' While the LOSC itself is not universally applicable,
179. See Int'l Mar. Org. [IMO], Rep. of the Thirty-Second Consultative Meeting and the
Fifth Meeting of the Contracting Parties, 14.16, LC 32/15 (Nov. 9, 2010).
180. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 29 (July 8); accord, e.g., Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment,
1997 I.C.J. 7, 1 140 (Sept. 25).
181. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972,
Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973).
182. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June 3-
14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration on Envi-
ronment and Development].
183. Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, in Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp.
No. 10, at 370, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Transboundary
Harm], reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 146, 97, art. 3, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).
184. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 192, 193, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1982 LOSC].
185. Id. art. 240(d).
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Parts XII and XIII are generally considered to be part of customary interna-
tional law and, consequently, binding on all states.186
A more stringent obligation to prevent harm to the environment can be
found in Article 3 of the 1991 Protocol to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which
requires that states party to the Protocol plan activities within the Antarctic
Treaty area so as to limit adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment and
its dependent and associated ecosystems, including climate or weather pat-
terns, water quality, and the marine environment.' These obligations are
again of particular relevance to ocean fertilization activities taking place
within the Southern Ocean 88 involving vessels and personnel based in states
party to the Protocol.
Cloud whitening or stratospheric aerosol injections are similarly subject
to the constraints of the widely ratified 1985 Vienna Convention for the Pro-
tection of the Ozone Layer, which requires parties to take measures to
"protect human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting
or likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modi-
fy the ozone layer."l 89 Article III of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty requires
parties to comply with international law when carrying out activities in outer
space; 190 this reference is arguably broad enough to encompass the preven-
tion-of-harm principle.
The principle of prevention of harm is an erga omnes norm and conse-
quently can be invoked by any state affected by or likely to be affected by
environmental harm resulting from geoengineering activities. As articulated
as a general principle within the treaties and declarations noted above, and
as a general principle of international environmental law, the threshold of
harm at which the principle becomes operational is unspecified. This not-
withstanding, a reasonable interpretation of this principle would require its
application in situations where the environmental harm is irreversible or se-
rious. While small-scale geoengineering experiments may not create a risk
of irreversible or serious harm, the risks associated with almost every option
of large-scale geoengineering (other than urban albedo enhancement and re-
forestation) would appear to be potentially serious. Nevertheless, one
important factor to bear in mind is that the purpose of geoengineering is to
avoid or mitigate the harmful consequences of climate change; consequent-
186. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 24 (3rd ed. 1999).
187. 1991 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection art. 3, Oct. 4,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1461 [hereinafter 1991 Environmental Protocol].
188. Although the 1991 Environmental Protocol ostensibly applies to the area south of
600 South, the reference to "dependent and associated ecosystems" in Articles 2 and 3 of the
Protocol potentially broaden its scope to parts of the Southern Ocean north of 600 South, par-
ticularly where activities also take place within the Antarctic Treaty area. Id. arts. 2, 3.
189. Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer art. 2(1), Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293; see also id. art. 2(2)(b).
190. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. I, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
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ly, the risk of harm associated with climate change is an important factor in
evaluating the risk of harm posed by geoengineering.
C. The Obligation to Prevent Pollution
The obligation to prevent pollution is arguably part of the broader obli-
gation to prevent harm, discussed above. However, this obligation is
primarily treaty based, and, consequently, the extent to which states are con-
strained by this principle depends on the application of the treaty in
question. Nevertheless, several treaties relating to certain geoengineering
technologies are universally, or at least widely, applicable.
Although no instrument explicitly prohibits the release of sulfate aero-
sols or even salt into the atmosphere, one regional instrument-the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)191-
requires contracting parties "to protect man and his environment against air
pollution" and to "endeavour to limit and, as far as possible, gradually re-
duce and prevent air pollution including long-range transboundary air
pollution." 92 Air pollution is broadly defined as
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or en-
ergy into the air resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as
to endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems
and material property and impair or interfere with amenities and
other legitimate uses of the environment. 93
The predicted negative impacts resulting from the release of sulfate aero-
sols undoubtedly possess the potential to constitute a deleterious effect on
health and other living resources, and, consequently, it might be argued
that large-scale geoengineering using such cloud-whitening techniques
should be considered contrary to the aims and objectives of LRTAP. The
deployment of salt designed to brighten marine clouds, on the other hand, is
much less likely to contravene LRTAP. Although ostensibly a regional con-
vention, LRTAP is applicable to fifty-one states including the members of
the European Union, Russia, much of Eastern Europe, and the United
States.194
The principles prohibiting pollution of the marine environment as set
out under the 1982 LOSC are universally applicable.195 Pollution is defined
under the Convention as
191. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S.
No. 10,541, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217.
192. Id. art. 2.
193. Id. art. 1(a).
194. Status of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, UNITED NA-
TIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg.no=XXVII-l&chapter-27&lang-en (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
195. See 1982 LOSC, supra note 184, pmbl.
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the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or en-
ergy into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results
or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living re-
sources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to
marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the
sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of
amenities.196
As noted by Philomene Verlaan, this definition focuses on the effects ra-
ther than the nature of the substance or energy in question.197 As described
above, many of the geoengineering technologies and techniques designed to
be deployed in or otherwise manipulate the marine environment, such as
iron fertilization or weathering, have the potential to result in deleterious ef-
fects, including impacts on ocean chemistry, biodiversity, and ecosystems. 198
It is nevertheless worth noting that not all marine geoengineering consti-
tutes, or will inevitably lead to, pollution. For example, the deployment of
vertical ocean pipes, which facilitate the transfer of nutrients from an
ocean's depths to its surface, cannot be themselves described as substance or
energy or even a means of introduction of a substance or energy likely to re-
sult in deleterious effects. However, Article 194 of the LOSC, which obliges
states to take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce, and control pollu-
tion from any source, is applicable to the majority of geoengineering
techniques.'99 Moreover, Article 196 specifically requires states to control
pollution from the use of technologies under their jurisdiction and control. 20 0
Significantly, under Article 195 of the LOSC, parties, "[i]n taking measures
to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment ... shall
act as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area
to another or transform one type of pollution into another."2 0' This has im-
portant implications for techniques designed to decrease atmospheric
concentrations of CO2 and commensurately increase ocean concentrations
of CO2, leading to ocean acidification. As noted above, the obligations to
prevent, reduce, and mitigate pollution are applicable to research activities
as well as to full-scale geoengineering.
Where substances such as iron, calcium hydroxide (lime), or calcium
carbonate are introduced into the ocean, the dumping regime comprising the
1972 London Convention and 1996 Protocol are directly applicable. 20 2
196. Id. art. 1(4).
197. Philomene Verlaan, Geo-engineering, the Law of the Sea, and Climate Change,
2009 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 446, 449.
198. See supra Part II; see also Verlaan, supra note 197, at 448-49.
199. 1982 LOSC, supra note 184, art. 194(1).
200. Id. art. 196.
201. Id. art. 195(1).
202. See Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter art. I11(1), Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter 1972
London Convention]; 1996 Protocol to the London Convention, supra note 8, art. 1.4.
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Although, as discussed above, LC-LP Resolution 1 (2008) stipulates that
fertilization for purposes other than legitimate scientific research is deemed
to be contrary to the aims and objectives of the Convention and Protocol, the
Resolution does not address other geoengineering techniques such as
weathering. 203 Dumping is defined under both the London Convention and
Protocol as "any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from
vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea."2" While
iron, calcium hydroxide, and calcium carbonate undoubtedly constitute
"other matter," it is open to debate whether they are "disposed of' given that
their purpose in the marine environment is to create an algal bloom or to
enhance the solubility pump. Moreover, both the London Convention and
Protocol deliberately exclude from the definition of dumping "placement of
matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided that such
placement is not contrary to the aims" of the Convention or Protocol.2 05 It is
this exception that is currently being relied on to permit fertilization for
legitimate scientific purposes.2 06
The large-scale execution of fertilization or weathering for the purpose
of mitigating climate change might be characterized as "placement of matter
for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof," but it must also be com-
patible with the aims of the Convention and Protocol. Both the London
Convention and Protocol indicate that their aims are the effective control of
all sources of pollution of the marine environment.20 7 To the extent that ge-
oengineering leads to marine pollution, it might be considered incompatible
with the aims of the London Convention and Protocol and therefore fall out-
side the exception. In this situation, the introduction of iron, calcium
hydroxide, or calcium carbonate would be considered "dumping" and sub-
ject to the controls under the London Convention and Protocol.
Under the 1972 London Convention, substances listed in Annex I may
not be dumped, while Annex II substances may be dumped subject to special
permission.2 0 8 All other substances may be dumped in accordance with a
general permit.209 As of 2012, iron, calcium hydroxide, and calcium
carbonate do not appear to be listed in either Annexes I or 11.210 Annex II
includes scrap metal, 21 1 but this is unlikely to include iron filings, which are
203. LC-LP Resolution LC-LP.1 (2008), supra note 178.
204. 1972 London Convention, supra note 202, art. III(1)(a); 1996 Protocol to the Lon-
don Convention, supra note 8, art. 1.4.1.
205. 1972 London Convention, supra note 202, art. III(1)(b); 1996 Protocol to the Lon-
don Convention, supra note 8, art. 1.4.2.
206. See infra notes 285-287.
207. 1972 London Convention, supra note 202, art. I; 1996 Protocol to the London Con-
vention, supra note 8, art. 2.
208. See 1972 London Convention, supra note 202, art. IV.
209. Id.
210. See id. annexes I, II.
211. Id. annex II.
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used for iron fertilization. Annex II also includes materials "which, though
of a non-toxic nature, may become harmful due to the quantities in which
they are dumped, or which are liable to seriously reduce amenities."2 12 It
might be argued that the quantities of iron, calcium hydroxide, and calcium
carbonate needed for climate change mitigation render them harmful, in
which case a special permit must be sought prior to dumping. Otherwise, it
would appear that these materials fall outside Annexes I and II and would
only require a general permit under Article IV(1)(c) of the London
Convention. The 1996 Protocol introduces a reverse-listing approach to
dumping and permits only those substances listed in its Annex I to be
dumped subject to a special permit.213 There is a provision in Annex I for the
dumping of bulky items comprising iron, 214 but again, this provision is very
unlikely to be considered applicable to the iron filings used in iron
fertilization. Annex I also permits "inert, inorganic geological material" to
be dumped (subject to a permit); 2 15 the key question here is the definition of
"inert." The Convention Guidelines require materials categorized as inert to
be essentially chemically unreactive. 216 There is in fact little scientific
consensus as to the definition of inert, and different disciplines take different
approaches. While chemists generally take a strict approach-there must be
no possibility of a chemical reaction-other scientists focus on the toxicity
of the substance and assess inertness in a relative sense.217 The Convention
Guidelines appear to support the latter approach and stipulate that
[k]ey factors in determining if a proposed material is inert are
knowledge of the material's constituents, including any potential
contaminants, and what, if any, reactions might occur following the
material's exposure to physical, chemical, or biological processes in
the marine environment. Material that may result in acute or chron-
ic toxicity, or in bioaccumulation of any of its constituents, should
not be considered inert.218
The final sentence would appear to introduce a damage threshold into the
definition of inert material. Although chemists would not regard any of the
proposed substances that are designed to manipulate either the solubility or
the biological pump in the marine environment as inert, calcium carbonate
may be considered inert according to the Convention Guidelines owing to its
212. Id.
213. 1996 Protocol to the London Convention, supra note 8, art. 4.1.
214. Id. annex I.
215. Id.
216. See IMO, GUIDELINES ON THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE
POLLUTION BY DUMPING OF WASTES AND OTHER MATTER, 1972, at 109, 1 13, IMO Sales No.
153 1E (2006 ed.) [hereinafter DUMPING GUIDELINES].
217. I am grateful to Dr. Ian Shaw, Professor of Toxicology, University of Canterbury,
for helpful information on the approach of chemists and other scientists to the question of in-
ertness.
218. DUMPING GUIDELINES, supra note 216, at 109, [ 14.
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very low toxicity. It is nevertheless unlikely that either iron or calcium hy-
droxide would be considered inert, particularly since they are specifically
designed to interact with and change the chemistry of the oceans.
The 1996 Protocol entered into force in 2006 and has been ratified by
forty-two states including the United Kingdom, China, and New Zealand.2 19
Neither Russia nor the United States has ratified the Protocol. The 1982
LOSC requires "states [to] adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and
control pollution . . . by dumping"2 20 and imposes obligations on flag states
as well as coastal, port, and loading221 states to comply with global rules and
standards. 222 Those global rules and standards, while not specified in the
LOSC, are traditionally considered to equate to the provisions of the 1972
London Convention. 223 There is no procedure within the 1982 LOSC to re-
place these standards with those agreed to under the 1996 Protocol, and it is
unclear at what point this will take place. Nevertheless, the general applica-
tion of the 1972 London Convention to marine geoengineering demonstrates
that for activities that constitute dumping at sea, a permit must be sought,
and the applicant must justify the proposed activity. In the case where
placement is for a purpose other than disposal, that placement must never-
theless be consistent with the broader aims and objectives of the 1972
London Convention in relation to the prevention of marine pollution.
D. The Obligation to Protect Vulnerable Ecosystems and Species
The third principle in the international environmental law canon is the
obligation to protect vulnerable ecosystems and species. Such an obligation
can be found in a number of international treaties including Article 8 of the
1992 Biodiversity Convention224 and Annex V of the 1991 Protocol to the
1959 Antarctic Treaty.225 Given the global nature of many of the proposed
options for geoengineering, it may prove difficult to apply this basic princi-
ple as a particular constraint. However, this is not necessarily the case for
technologies and techniques designed to manipulate the marine environ-
ment.
219. 1996 Protocol to the London Convention 1972: Overview of Contracting States,
INT'L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/blast/blastData.asp?doc-id=7541 &type=body (last up-
dated May 28, 2012). By contrast, the 1972 Convention has eighty-seven state parties. IMO,
Status of the London Convention and Protocol: Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Status of
the London Convention 1972, 2, LC 34/2 (July 19, 2012). Scientists based in or collaborat-
ing with those in New Zealand have been quite active in connection with research into ocean
fertilization and weathering.
220. 1982 LOSC, supra note 184, art. 210. Dumping is defined in very similar terms to
the 1972 London Convention in Article 1(5) of the 1982 LOSC. Compare 1972 London Con-
vention, supra note 202, art. III(1)(a), with 1982 LOSC, supra note 184, art. 1(5).
221. 1982 LOSC, supra note 184, art. 216.
222. Id. arts. 210(6), 216(1).
223. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 186, at 369-70.
224. CBD, supra note 9, art. 8.
225. 1991 Environmental Protocol, supra note 187, annex V.
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Article 194(5) of the 1982 LOSC stipulates that "[t]he measures taken
in accordance with this Part shall include those necessary to protect and pre-
serve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened
or endangered species and other forms of marine life."226 Where protected
areas or special measures have been established, these are likely to operate
as constraints on activities designed to manipulate ocean chemistry or pre-
cipitate an algal bloom. Coastal states may establish marine protected areas
within their maritime zones and are able to regulate activities such as the re-
lease of iron or calcium hydroxide within their waters for climate change
mitigation or for research purposes.2 7 The development of high-seas marine
protected areas (MPAs) is an emerging field of international regulation. The
first-and so far, only-network of high-seas MPAs was recently estab-
lished by the parties to the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention). 228 Six high-
seas protected areas were designated within the OSPAR maritime area in
2010, and it is notable that the 2008 OSPAR Code of Conduct for Responsi-
ble Marine Research in the Deep Seas and High Seas of the OSPAR
Maritime Area229 requires a higher level of protection when activities are
carried out within OSPAR MPAs.2 30 The Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal
Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable
use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction, es-
tablished in 2004 by the U.N. General Assembly,231 recommended in 2011
that the General Assembly initiate a process
226. 1982 LOSC, supra note 184, art. 194(5).
227. See id. art. 56 (giving coastal states exclusive jurisdiction to protect and preserve
the marine environment within their exclusive economic zones [EEZs] as well as to regulate
research activities). They are also able to regulate research activities, and, while normally
coastal states should give their consent to research taking place within their EEZs, consent can
be withheld where the research involves the introduction of harmful substances into the ma-
rine environment. Id. art. 246(5)(b).
228. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlan-
tic, opened for signature Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67. The network of high-seas MPAs
were established pursuant to Annex V of the Protection and Conservation of the Ecosystems
and Biological Diversity of the Maritime Area to the 1992 OSPAR Convention (as amended).
Id. annex V, art. 3; Meeting of the OSPAR Commission, Bremen, Ger., June 23-27, 2003,
Recommendation 2003/3 on a Network of Marine Protected Areas, pmbl., para. 2, OSPAR
03/17/1-E, Annex 9 (June 27, 2003); see OSPAR Comm'n, Strategy of the OSPAR Commis-
sion for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 2010-2020, pt.
II, I 4.2f(i), OSPAR Comm'n Agreement 2010-03 (Sept. 24, 2010) [hereinafter OSPAR North-
East Atlantic Strategy].
229. OSPAR Comm'n, 2008 OSPAR Code of Conduct for Responsible Marine Research
in the Deep Seas and High Seas of the OSPAR Maritime Area, 15-16, OSPAR 08/24/1, An-
nex 6 (Jan. 2008) [hereinafter 2008 OSPAR Code of Conduct]; see OSPAR North-East Atlantic
Strategy, supra note 228, pt. II, 4.2f.
230. 2008 OSPAR Code of Conduct, supra note 229, 1 15.
231. Oceans and the Law of the Sea, G.A. Res. 59/49a, [73, U.N. Doc. AIRES/59/24
(Nov. 17, 2004).
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with a view to ensuring that the legal framework for the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond
national jurisdiction effectively addresses those issues by identify-
ing gaps and ways forward, including through the implementation
of existing instruments and the possible development of a multilat-
eral agreement under the [LOSC]. 23 2
The Working Group noted that MPAs constitute an important tool for the
protection and conservation of marine biological diversity beyond national
jurisdiction. 233
Although the obligation to adopt higher levels of protection and a more
cautious attitude toward environmental risk within protected areas is of rela-
tively limited applicability to global geoengineering activities at the
moment, it should be recognized that this is a principle of increasing signifi-
cance within international environmental law. As the network of MPAs both
within and beyond national jurisdiction develops, this principle will inevita-
bly operate as a growing constraint on activities associated with both
research into and the deployment of geoengineering for climate change mit-
igation.
E. The Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle or approach is not only an integral compo-
nent of modem international environmental law but is of particularly
apposite application to geoengineering. The most common articulation of
the precautionary approach can be found in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio
Declaration: "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary ap-
proach shall be widely applied by states according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scien-
tific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation."2 34
In essence, the precautionary approach, which comprises both a sub-
stantive and a procedural obligation, requires a more cautious approach to
the authorization of activities in situations where there are threats of serious
environmental harm. As a matter of procedure, scientific uncertainty must
be explicitly considered as part of the decision-making process and must not
be used as justification to authorize activities that pose a risk of serious harm
to the environment or to postpone cost-effective measures designed to pre-
vent such harm. The terms "principle" and "approach" are commonly
used, but there is no substantive difference between the two with respect to
232. Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Letter dated June
30, 2011 from the Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to the Pres-
ident of the General Assembly, 1 1, U.N. Doc. A/66/119, Annex (June 30, 2011).
233. Id. 23.
234. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 182, princ. 15.
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the nature or extent of the obligation imposed.235 Both the nature and ex-
tent of the precautionary approach are contextually dependent upon the
particular articulation of the level of harm, the de gree or nature of scien-
tific uncertainty within a treaty, and, importantly, whether the burden of
proving harm and uncertainty is reversed. 2 36 Nevertheless, the widespread
application of the precautionary approach in situations where there is a
risk of serious harm to the environment is such that it can be considered part
of international environmental law. 237 This has been recently, albeit indirect-
ly, confirmed by the ICJ in the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case, where
the Court accepted that the "precautionary approach may be relevant in the
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Statute" in dispute be-
tween Uruguay and Argentina.23m The Court's implicit reference to Article
31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties239 implies
that it regards the precautionary approach as a relevant rule of international
law applicable to both Uruguay and Argentina. This interpretation of the
ICJ's conclusion was confirmed in early 2011 by the Seabed Disputes
Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Advisory
Opinion No. 17.240 In that case, the Chamber noted that
the precautionary approach has been incorporated into a growing
number of international treaties and other instruments, many of
which reflect the formulation of Principle 15 of the Rio Declara-
tion. In the view of the Chamber, this has initiated a trend towards
making this approach part of customary international law.241
235. The "precautionary approach" is the term commonly employed in international
treaties, whereas European treaties and European Union law more regularly refer to the "pre-
cautionary principle." See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 23, at 155; see also SIMON MARR, THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: MODERN DECISION MAKING IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 17-21 (Vaughan Lowe ed., 2003); ARIE TROUWBORST, PRECAUTIONARY
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES 11 (2006).
236. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 23, at 162-63.
237. Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell suggest that the precautionary approach constitutes a
binding legal obligation by virtue of its status as a general principle of law. Id. at 162-63. Oth-
er commentators conclude that it is a principle of customary international law. E.g.,
TROUWBORST, supra note 235, at 295-96.
238. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Urm.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 71, 164
(Apr. 10).
239. Id.; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
240. Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with
Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M.
458 (2011), available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case no_17/
advop_01021 1.pdf. For commentary on this opinion, see David Freestone, Responsibilities
and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Ar-
ea, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 755, 755-60 (2011).
241. Responsibilities and Obligations of States, Case No. 17, 135.
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Most geoengineering techniques and technologies pose a risk, in some
cases a significant risk, to the environment. Moreover, the extent and nature
of the risks involved are largely unknown. With respect to geoengineering in
the marine environment, the obligations of states to prevent pollution under
the LOSC must be interpreted to incorporate the precautionary approach re-
lying on Articles 31(3)(b) and 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.2 42
Strategies that involve the dumping or placement of substances into the ma-
rine environment must be justified by their proponents under the dumping
regime, which in practice reverses the burden of proof in its application of
the precautionary principle. 243 Furthermore, as a general principle, or possi-
bly as a principle of customary international law, the precautionary approach
requires the risk of serious harm to the environment and the degree of scien-
tific uncertainty to be explicitly considered by decision makers charged with
authorizing any geoengineering-related activity. However, unless specified
under an applicable regime, the precautionary approach does not automati-
cally reverse the burden of proving the harmful (or otherwise) nature of an
activity.244
The nature, and indeed the extent, of the environmental risks associated
with geoengineering could potentially justify a moratorium on the
deployment of, or even research into, these techniques and technologies.
However, as noted above, geoengineering constitutes a response to, and an
attempt to mitigate, a serious risk of environmental harm: climate change. A
moratorium on geoengineering would inevitably stifle research and
innovation and, in the context of climate change, might itself be regarded as
contrary to Article 3(3) of the 1992 UNFCCC.2 45 Decision makers therefore
need to consider the environmental risks associated with climate change as
242. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 239, art. 31(3)(b)-(c).
This interpretation relies on the recognition by the International Court of Justice and the Sea-
bed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea that the
precautionary approach constitutes a relevant rule of international law applicable in the rela-
tions between the parties. See supra notes 238-241 and accompanying text. The precautionary
approach to marine environmental protection has been endorsed in numerous declarations and
documents including Chapter 17 of Agenda 21. U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Div. for
Sustainable Dev., Earth Summit: Agenda 21, ch. 17 (Apr. 23, 1993), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21.
243. See 1972 London Convention, supra note 202, art. IV; 1996 Protocol to the London
Convention, supra note 8, art. 4.
244. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 71, $ 163
(Apr. 10).
245. See 1992 UNFCCC, supra note 32, art. 3(3). The UNFCCC requires parties to
take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of cli-
mate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason
for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to
deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at
the lowest possible cost.
Id.
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well as the risks associated with geoengineering. This is far from a
straightforward task, and cultural attitudes to risk, climate change, and
technology will inevitably influence an evaluation of the environmental
risks associated with geoengineering. Without a specific framework to guide
the application of the precautionary approach to geoengineering, it is almost
inevitable that some states will conclude that the risks associated with
geoengineering are justified in the context of the greater risks posed by
climate change and that other states will disagree. This represents a serious
predicament because geoengineering deployed as a climate change
mitigation measure will affect all states.
F. Obligations to Cooperate, Exchange Information, and
Assess Environmental Impacts
The fifth principle, or more accurately, category of principles, is proce-
dural in nature and focuses on the obligations associated with cooperation,
information exchange, and environmental impact assessment. All of these
obligations are provided for under numerous environmental and other trea-
ties and, arguably, are now part of the corpus of international environmental
law more generally.
Obligations to cooperate and exchange information connected to re-
search, the deployment of geoengineering technologies, or environmental
emergencies associated with geoengineering activities can be derived from
broadly phrased commitments set out in Article 4(1)(h) of the 1992
UNFCCC 246 Article 14(1)(c) of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, 247 Article
18 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, 24 8 and Articles 4 and 8 of the 2001 Draft Arti-
cles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm. 249 More specific obligations
can be found in the 1976 ENMOD Convention, under which over seventy
states have undertaken to fully exchange information on, and cooperate in re-
lation to, environmental modification for peaceful purposes. 250 In connection
with marine geoengineering, the 1982 LOSC imposes an obligation on
states to cooperate on a global or regional basis for the protection of the ma-
rine environment 251 and sets out various obligations associated with
notification in an environmental emergency,252 as well as obligations with
respect to cooperation and dissemination of information arising from scien-
tific research. 253 Similar, although less well-developed, principles apply to
246. Id. art. 4(1)(h).
247. See CBD, supra note 9, art. 14(1)(c).
248. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 182, princ. 18.
249. See Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm, supra note 183, 97, arts. 4, 8.
250. 1976 ENMOD Convention, supra note 171, arts. HI(3), V(1).
251. See 1982 LOSC, supra note 184, art. 197; The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Case
No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001, 5 ITLOS Rep. 95, 82, available at http://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/caseno_10/Order.03.12.01.E.pdf.
252. 1982 LOSC, supra note 184, arts. 198, 200.
253. Id. art. 244(2).
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space-based geoengineering as a consequence of Articles IX and XI of the
1967 Outer Space Treaty.254 The 1967 Outer Space Treaty is widely ratified
with the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and China among its
parties. 255
The principle of environmental impact assessment is now so widely ap-
plied that it has recently been recognized by the ICJ as a general principle of
international environmental law applicable where the impacts of an activity
have transboundary25 6 or commons implications. 257 Geoengineering methods
that involve the release of sulfate aerosols, seek to create algal blooms, or
involve the deployment of space sunshades indubitably raise the possibility
(or even inevitability) of transboundary or commons impacts and, conse-
quently, are subject to environmental impact assessment obligations. More
specifically, where an activity may have significant adverse effects on bio-
logical diversity, environmental impact assessments must be carried out with
respect to such activities taking place in the territory, or under the control of,
states party to the 1992 Biodiversity Convention.258 With the notable excep-
tion of the United States, the Biodiversity Convention is almost universally
254. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 190, arts. IX, XI. It is also worth noting that the
1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space requires states to reg-
ister space objects launched into the earth's orbit or beyond. Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space art. 1(1), Nov. 12, 1974, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15;
see also Recommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and International Intergov-
ernmental Organizations in Registering Space Objects, G.A. Res. 62/101, I1 209-215, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/62/101 (Jan. 10, 2008).
255. As of January 1, 2012, the Outer Space Treaty had 101 parties. Status of Interna-
tional Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER
SPACE AFF., http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2013).
256. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 71, 1204
(Apr. 10); see also Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7,
141 (Sept. 25).
257. Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with
Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M.
458, H 145, 148 (2011), available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases
caseno_17/advop_01021 1.pdf.
258. CBD, supra note 9, art. 14; see also Conference of the Parties to the CBD at Its
Eighth Meeting, Curitiba, Braz., Mar. 20-31, 2006, Impact Assessment: Voluntary Guidelines
on Biodiversity-Inclusive Impact Assessment, 5, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VIII/28 (June 15,
2006) (establishing voluntary guidelines for addressing biodiversity-related concerns when
conducting environmental impact assessments). The parties to the CBD are also in the process
of developing voluntary guidance for the implementation of environmental impact assess-
ments in areas beyond national jurisdiction. See Expert Workshop on Scientific and Technical
Aspects Relevant to Environmental Impact Assessment in Marine Areas Beyond National Ju-
risdiction, Manila, Phil., Nov. 18-20, 2009, Report of the Expert Workshop on Scientific and
Technical Aspects Relevant to Environmental Impact Assessment in Marine Areas Beyond Na-
tional Jurisdiction, 1-3, UNEP/CBD/EW-EIAMA/2 (Nov. 20, 2009); Conference of the
Parties to the CBD, Nayoga, Japan, Oct. 18-29, 2010, Marine and Coastal Biodiversity,
J 13(c), UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/29 (Oct. 29, 2010).
345Winter 2013]
Michigan Journal of International Law
applicable.25 9 Environmental impact assessment requirements are also pro-
vided for under the 1982 LOSC 260 and have been strongly endorsed by the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea as an important tool for marine
environmental protection.2 61 Additionally, many regional instruments pro-
vide for detailed environmental impact assessment obligations: Article 8 of
the 1991 Environmental Protocol to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, for example,
subjects activities (including scientific research) likely to have more than a
minor or a transitory impact on the environment to a process of comprehen-
sive environmental evaluation. 262 It is almost inconceivable that any
geoengineering option other than urban albedo enhancement and perhaps re-
forestation could take place without first being subject to some form of
environmental impact assessment. Indeed, impact assessment is integral to
the implementation of the precautionary principle.
G. The Obligation to Act with Due Regard to Other States
The penultimate principle of international environmental law, the obli-
gation to act with due regard to other users and other states (essentially good
neighborliness), underpins but goes beyond several of the principles out-
lined above. While not immediately associated with international
environmental law, due regard plays an important role in the context of
oceans governance and the management of international water courses. With
respect to geoengineering, the principle of due regard operates as an im-
portant regulatory constraint in connection with marine and space-based
technologies and is of particular significance where the technology in ques-
tion cannot be categorized as constituting, or leading to, pollution. For
example, while scientific research is a high-seas freedom,2 63 it must be exer-
cised with "due regard for the interests of other States.""2 Objects placed in
the ocean-such as vertical pipes or reflective particles-must not exces-
sively hinder navigation or the freedom to fish or lay cables and pipelines.
The principle of due regard is generally applicable to the oceans and is
consequently of relevance to all geoengineering activities irrespective of
their purpose. A rather more basic obligation is applicable to space-based
activities under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which requires parties to con-
259. See List of Parties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://
www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
260. 1982 LOSC, supra note 184, art. 206.
261. See Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v.
Sing.), Case No. 12, Order of Oct. 8, 2003, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/
itlos/documents/cases/caseno_12/Order.08.10.03.E.pdf; Responsibilities and Obligations of
States, Case No. 17.
262. 1991 Environmental Protocol, supra note 187. For further details, see id. annex I.
263. 1982 LOSC, supra note 184, art. 87(1)(f).
264. See id. art. 87(2).
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duct their interests with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other
state parties. 265
H. Responsibility for Environmental Harm
The final principle of international environmental law is state responsi-
bility. By no means confined to the context of environmental harm, state
responsibility is nevertheless a fundamental component of the discipline of
international environmental law. Article 1 of the 2001 Draft Articles on State
Responsibility codifies the principle that "[e]very internationally wrongful
act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State."2 66 To the
extent that geoengineering harms or pollutes the environment of another
state or otherwise interferes with the rights of another state, the state that
carried out or authorized the geoengineering may be held responsible under
international law. Many if not all of the obligations identified as part of the
corpus of international environmental law are erga omnes and thus owed to
the international community as a whole.267
In this context, the wrongful act must be attributed to the state alleged to
be responsible, and, consequently, a state is not automatically held responsi-
ble for damage caused by private individuals unless that state authorized or
was legally responsible for authorizing those activities. Responsibility under
international law is not absolute, and in the case of all of the principles iden-
tified above, the test is that of due diligence.268 Consequently, responsibility
is dependent upon fault. Issues in relation to causation are likely to arise in
connection with environmental harm alleged to result from geoengineering
that are similar to those that complicate any attempt to hold states responsi-
ble for environmental harm associated with climate change. In practice, it
may prove challenging to demonstrate that changes in monsoon patterns are
a result of stratospheric sulfate aerosol injections, or that ozone depletion is
caused by the weakening of the Southern Ocean methyl bromide sink,
which is in turn a consequence of ocean iron fertilization.269 Finally, it is
worth noting that wrongful conduct may be excused under international law
265. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 190, art. IX.
266. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, in
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, 56 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 [hereinafter 2001 Draft Articles], reprinted in
[2001] 2 YB. Int'l L. Comm'n 26,176, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.l (Part 2).
267. See supra Part IRl.
268. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 23, at 214-16.
269. Issues of responsibility and liability arising from the manipulation of weather and
climate are not in fact new, and an early discussion of liability arising from rainmaking can be
found in the 1949 Stanford Law Review. See Note, Artificial Rainmaking, 1 STAN. L. REV.
508, 531-37 (1949). For an early discussion of other legal issues associated with the early ex-
periments in rainmaking, see Note, Who Owns the Clouds?, 1 STAN. L. REv. 43, 43 (1948).
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if one or more of a narrow range of defenses-such as force majeure270 or
necessity27 1-applies.
In addition to the general rules on state responsibility, individual treaty
regimes may also set out the consequences arising from a wrongful breach.
For example, Article 235(1) of the 1982 LOSC stipulates that parties are
"responsible for the fulfillment of their international obligations concerning
the protection and preservation of the marine environment [and] shall be liable
in accordance with international law."27 2 Similarly, states party to the 1967
Outer Space Treaty are deemed to bear responsibility for national activities in
outer space and, notably, are also responsible for the activities of
nongovernmental entities in space. 273 On a regional basis, it should be noted
that while Annex VI to the 1991 Environmental Protocol to the 1959
Antarctic Treaty is not yet in force, it will ultimately address responsibility
and liability of operators in connection with accidental events leading to
environmental harm. 274
Identifying who is entitled to invoke responsibility for harm resulting
from geoengineering under international law is as important as identifying
the state (or states) responsible for that harm. Although the various obliga-
tions to prevent harm, protect vulnerable ecosystems, and carry out
environmental impact assessments can be characterized as erga omnes and
owed to the international community as a whole, this does not inevitably
mean that any state is entitled to take action. 27 5 States that have suffered
damage and are individually affected by a breach of international law may
invoke the doctrine of state responsibility,276 and where the breach "is of
such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States to
which the obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the
obligation,"277 any state to which the obligation is owed may invoke respon-
270. 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 266, 176, art. 23.
271. Id. 76, art. 25. In reality it would seem very unlikely that a defense of necessity
would succeed. A breach of international law can only be justified under necessity if the
breach constitutes the only means of safeguarding an essential interest against grave and im-
minent peril. Id. 177, art. 25, cmt. 1. It is unlikely that the urgency requirement embedded in
the defense would be met by the impacts of climate change. It is also worth noting that neces-
sity cannot be used as a defense if the state seeking to rely on necessity contributed to the
situation of necessity. Id. 77, art. 25, cmt. 20. Arguably, this requirement would preclude the
United States, western Europe, Russia, and Australia from relying on the defense of necessity.
272. 1982 LOSC, supra note 184, art. 235(1).
273. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 190, art. VI. The Outer Space Treaty imposes abso-
lute liability on the launching state for damage caused to another state by an object launched
into space. However, this provision, which is complemented by the Convention on Interna-
tional Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961
U.N.T.S. 187, is focused on the physical damage caused by the object rather than the indirect
harm resulting from the deployment of that object.
274. See 1991 Environmental Protocol, supra note 187, art. 16, annex VI.
275. See, e.g., East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 29 (June 30).
276. 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 266, 76, art. 42(b)(i).
277. Id. 76, art. 42(b)(ii).
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sibility. It is not clear, however, that any state would have standing to hold
another state responsible for damage to the global commons. Moreover,
state responsibility is temporally static and does not easily address the inter-
ests and claims that future generations may have as a result of the
geoengineering decisions taken today. Just as the impacts of climate change
are likely to more significantly affect future as opposed to present genera-
tions, the impacts and more general consequences of geoengineering will
inevitably affect future generations of humankind.
Intergenerational equity is an emerging principle of international envi-
ronmental law that requires states to consider the impacts of their decisions
on future generations.278 It is relevant when implementing obligations to
prevent harm and to act cautiously where there is a risk of significant harm
to the environment, but it is also part of the broader question of responsibil-
ity. Intergenerational equity is at the heart of the notion of sustainable
development and in essence describes the obligation to balance the interests
and needs of present generations with those of future generations. The inter-
ests of future generations are acknowledged in numerous environmental
instruments including the 1992 UNFCCC, which calls for the protection of
the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of hu-
mankind.279 There is no process under current international environmental
law for formally incorporating the interests of future generations into deci-
sion making, and there is little guidance on how the benefits and burdens of
environmental protection should be shared between generations. 20 Howev-
er, Edith Brown Weiss has argued that intergenerational equity comprises
the following principles: conservation of options, conservation of environ-
mental quality, and conservation of access to resources. 281 Geoengineering
deployed today has the undoubted potential to compromise both environ-
mental quality and access to environmental resources in the future but, more
significantly, may also reduce or eliminate options available to future gener-
ations to mitigate climate change. William Bums has recently argued that
the deployment of SRM techniques, in particular, would violate the princi-
ple of intergenerational equity, since such techniques would have to be
maintained indefinitely, and, at some point, the option of emissions reduc-
tions to mitigate climate change will become practically impossible. 282 The
question of state responsibility is therefore not simply confined to the here
278. Bums, supra note 162, at 38, 42-43.
279. 1992 UNFCCC, supra note 32, pmbl., para. 23.
280. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 23, at 122; see Sa. & ENVTL. HEALTH NETWORK & THE
INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCH., MODELS FOR PROTECTING THE ENVI-
RONMENT FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS 1-3 (2008).
281. Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the En-
vironment, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 198, 201-02 (1990); see also EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN
FAIRNESS To FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY AND IN-
TERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 38 (1989).
282. Bums, supra note 162, at 45-49.
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and now but must also be considered in the context of future generations of
humankind.
I. Geoengineering and International Environmental
Law As a Discipline
As an activity that creates a real risk of significant harm to the environ-
ment, geoengineering can be used as a case study to demonstrate the
existence of international environmental law as a discrete body of generally
applicable principles and norms. Notwithstanding the absence of a regulato-
ry regime particularly applicable to geoengineering, states engaging in or
authorizing geoengineering activities are constrained by their obligations to
prevent serious harm and pollution, to protect vulnerable ecosystems, to act
with precaution, to carry out environmental impact assessments, to cooper-
ate in connection with information exchange, and to act with due regard to
other users. If they fail to comply with these obligations, which are owed to
the international community generally, they may be held responsible for this
failure under international law. However, geoengineering also demonstrates
the limits of international environmental law as a discipline. In the absence
of a specific regulatory framework, the application and implementation of
these principles may vary according to the values states attach to the risks of
geoengineering compared with the risks associated with climate change it-
self. Moreover, although states must consider the interests and needs of
future generations, there is no mechanism through which those interests and
needs can be formally factored into decision making, and, again, the imple-
mentation of intergenerational equity is likely to be variable according to the
values placed on present and future risks. Consequently, international envi-
ronmental law as a discipline represents the start but not the end of the
regulatory framework for geoengineering.
IV. THE EVOLVING REGULATORY REGIME FOR
OCEAN FERTILIZATION: A PRECEDENT?
Thus far, the only geoengineering strategy that policy makers and regu-
lators have given serious consideration is ocean fertilization. 283 As noted
283. Similarly, ocean fertilization has been subject to serious critical consideration by
commentators. See Christine Bertram, Ocean Iron Fertilization in the Context of the Kyoto
Protocol and the Post-Kyoto Process, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 1130, 1138-39 (2010); David Free-
stone & Rosemary Rayfuse, Ocean Iron Fertilization and International Law, 364 MARINE
ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 227, 227 (2008); Kerstin Gilssow et al., Ocean Iron Fertilization:
Why Further Research is Needed, 34 MARINE POL'Y 911, 911 (2010); Rosemary Rayfuse,
Drowning Our Sorrows to Create a Carbon Free Future? Some International Legal Consider-
ations Relating to Sequestering Carbon by Fertilizing the Oceans, 14 U. N.S.W. L.J. 54, 58
(2008); Rosemary Rayfuse et al., Ocean Fertilisation and Climate Change: The Need to Regu-
late Emerging High Seas Uses, 23 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 297, 324-25 (2008);
Philomine Verlaan, Current Legal Developments: London Convention and London Protocol,
26 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 185, 186 (2011); Verlaan, supra note 197, at 455; Robin
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above, ocean fertilization for nonscientific purposes has been deemed sub-
ject to, and, at the moment, contrary to, the 1972 London Convention and
1996 Protocol. 284 Ocean fertilization for legitimate scientific research pur-
poses is permitted on the basis that it constitutes placement for a purpose
other than mere disposal under Article III. 1(b)(ii) of the 1972 London Con-
vention285 and Article 1.4.2.2 of the 1996 Protocol, 28 6 provided that it is
carried out in accordance with the Assessment Framework agreed to by the
Convention and Protocol parties in 20 10.287
The Assessment Framework "provides a tool for assessing proposed ac-
tivities on a case-by-case basis [in order] to determine" their compatibility
with the Convention and Protocol.288 Pursuant to the Framework, parties
must carry out an initial assessment in order to determine whether the activi-
ty proposed constitutes an ocean fertilization experiment. Parties must then
undertake a full environmental assessment of the activity, including consid-
eration of the site of the proposed experiment, the likely environmental
impact of the experiment, and the risks (both known and unknown) associ-
ated with it. 289 Where experiments are authorized, the Assessment
Framework requires parties to put in place procedures to permit monitoring
and, where appropriate, facilitate adaptive management with respect to the
experiment. Significantly, the Assessment Framework requires parties to act
with caution and stipulates that where adverse effects are predicted, projects
should be abandoned.2 90 The Assessment Framework is a model of precau-
tionary and adaptive management and compares favorably with other
instruments providing for environmental impact assessments such as the
1991 Environmental Protocol to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.291 Nevertheless,
Resolution LC-LP 2 (2010) is not in and of itself binding, and it remains to
be seen how the Assessment Framework will be implemented by parties
with respect to individual proposed activities.
Warner, Marine Snow Storms: Assessing the Environmental Risks of Ocean Fertilization, 2009
CARBON & CLIMATE L. REv. 426, 426-27; Robin Warner, Preserving a Balanced Ocean:
Regulating Climate Change Mitigation Activities in Marine Areas Beyond National Jurisdic-
tion, 14 AUSTL. INT'L L.J. 99, 103 (2007); see also Jennie Dean, Iron Fertilization: A
Scientific Review with International Policy Recommendations, 32 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y J. 321, 322 (2009); Harald Ginzky, Ocean Fertilization As Climate Change Mitigation
Measure-Consideration Under International Law, 7 J. EUR. ENVTL. & PLANNING L. 57, 57
(2010); James Edward Peterson, Can Algae Save Civilization? A Look at Technology, Law,
and Policy Regarding Iron Fertilization of the Ocean to Counteract the Greenhouse Effect, 6
COLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 61, 62-64 (1995).
284. LC-LP Resolution LC-LP. 1 (2008), supra note 178, T 8.
285. See 1972 London Convention, supra note 202, art m(1)(b)(ii).
286. 1996 Protocol to the London Convention, supra note 8, art. 1.4.2.2.
287. LC-LP, Resolution LC-LP2(2010) on the Assessment Framework for Scientific Re-
search Involving Ocean Fertilization, T 1.2, LC 32/15 (Oct. 14, 2010); see id. § 1.
288. Id. 1.2.
289. Id. 1.3.
290. Id. 1.2.
291. 1991 Environmental Protocol, supra note 187, pmbl.
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The process of developing a regulatory framework for ocean
fertilization was initiated in 2008, and, at the beginning of 2012, four
regulatory options were under serious consideration by the parties to the
1972 London Convention and 1996 Protocol. The first option comprises an
amendment to the 1996 Protocol adding one additional annex designed to
regulate ocean fertilization. 29 2 The second option consists of an amendment
to the 1996 Protocol adding two additional annexes that would separate out
the principles permitting or prohibiting ocean fertilization from the
Assessment Framework, the latter being located in the second annex. 293 The
adoption of a resolution interpreting the 1972 London Convention and 1996
Protocol so that it applies to ocean fertilization represents the third option,
although it is unclear whether this would be a binding or nonbinding
resolution. 294 The final option comprises the implementation of, and
gathering experience from, the Ocean Fertilization Assessment Framework
without the adoption of further regulatory steps. 295 At the 2011 meeting, a
number of delegations declared themselves in favor of options one or two, 296
while the United States indicated that it endorsed option four;29 7 ultimately,
no consensus as to a preferred option was achieved. The terms of reference
of the Intersessional Working Group on Ocean Fertilization were
consequently revived and revised, and the question of regulation will be
revisited in 2012.298
In light of the active interest in ocean fertilization by not only scientists
but by private, for-profit operators such as Planktos and Climos, 299 binding
regulations as opposed to self-regulation are to be preferred. Moreover, de-
spite the presence of Resolution LC-LP.1 (2008), which asserts that ocean
fertilization falls within the scope of the dumping regulatory framework,300
it would be desirable to amend these instruments to formally reflect this po-
sition. However, options one and two identified by the parties focus on
amending the 1996 Protocol rather than the 1972 London Convention and
292. See Thirty-Third Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the London Con-
vention & Sixth Meeting of Parties to the London Protocol, Montrial, Can., Oct. 17-21, 2011,
Report of the 3rd Meeting of the Intersessional Working Group on Ocean Fertilization, 4.1,
LC 33/4 (June 20, 2011).
293. Id. 14.2.
294. See id. 1 4.11, 4.13-15.
295. Id. 4.12.
296. See Thirty-Third Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the London Con-
vention & Sixth Meeting of Parties to the London Protocol, Montrial, Canada, Oct. 17-21,
2011, Report of the Thirty-Third Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the London
Convention and the Sixth Meeting of Parties to the London Protocol, 4.11, LC 33/15 (Nov.
8,2011).
297. Id. 4.18, annex 2.
298. Id. 14.23.
299. Marc Gunther, Dumping Iron, FORTUNE (Apr. 16, 2008, 8:24 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/04/15/technology/climos.fortune/index.htm.
300. LC-LP Resolution LC-LP. 1 (2008), supra note 178, 1.
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Protocol. While an amended 1996 Protocol will bind the forty-one states
party to that Protocol, the majority of states, including the United States,
will not be bound by the ocean fertilization regulatory regime. As discussed
above, the international standards referred to in Article 210 of the LOSC
comprise those set out under the 1972 London Convention, and it is not
clear at what stage the 1996 Protocol will be treated as superseding the 1972
London Convention for the purposes of the LOSC.301 Furthermore, the obli-
gations imposed on states under Articles 210 and 216 of the 1982 LOSC
apply to dumping activities rather than to activities constituting placement
for a purpose other than dumping. 302
More generally, the approach of the parties to the 1972 London Conven-
tion and 1996 Protocol in separating ocean fertilization research from ocean
fertilization deployment is open to criticism. While such research may be
undertaken to improve our understanding of ocean circulation and the car-
bon cycle, the majority of experiments to date have sought to demonstrate
the effectiveness (or otherwise) of ocean fertilization as a climate change
mitigation measure. These experiments use resources that could be deployed
elsewhere and arguably encourage the view that ocean fertilization repre-
sents a viable climate change mitigation measure.3 03 The parties to the 1972
London Convention and 1996 Protocol have not debated seriously the merits
of ocean fertilization or geoengineering more generally in the context of
climate change mitigation, and arguably the dumping regime is not an ap-
propriate forum for such a debate. While the Assessment Framework is
entirely commendable on its own terms, it assumes without question that
scientific research into ocean fertilization as a climate change mitigation
measure is a meritorious activity. Given that this debate has yet to take
place, this conclusion seems somewhat premature. In short, states need to
address the ethical and moral issues associated with climate change mitiga-
tion in the Anthropocene before attempting to devise detailed regulations
authorizing specific activities such as ocean fertilization research.
V. REGULATING GEOENGINEERING IN THE
ANTHROPOCENE: A PROPOSAL
International environmental law provides a basic regulatory framework
for geoengineering and serves a valuable function in constraining proposals
for large-scale deployment that risk significant environmental harm. More
specifically, the Assessment Framework designed to control and facilitate
ocean fertilization research activities provides a model example of precau-
tionary and adaptive management. However, neither the emerging regulatory
301. See supra notes 219-223 and accompanying text.
302. 1982 LOSC, supra note 184, arts. 210, 216.
303. See Stephen M. Gardiner, Is "Arming the Future" with Geoengineering Really the
Lesser Evil?, in CLIMATE ETHICS: ESSENTIAL READINGs 284, 289-90 (Stephen Gardiner et al.
eds., 2010).
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framework for ocean fertilization nor international environmental law more
generally provide a suitable forum or framework within which key ethical,
policy, and legal questions associated with geoengineering for climate
change mitigation can be addressed.
Geoengineering is qualitatively different from other mechanisms in-
tended to mitigate or adapt to climate change. Geoengineering technologies
and techniques are designed to lower surface temperatures or deliberately
alter the carbon cycle on a global scale; all states and all peoples are likely
to be affected. However, unlike emissions reductions and adaptation, which
inherently require collective action in order to succeed, geoengineering
technologies can potentially be deployed by a small number of states or
even unilaterally by one powerful state acting in what it perceives to be the
best interests of all states.30 Moreover, these technologies are such that
companies or even wealthy individuals might choose-out of altruism or for
profit-to mitigate climate change through geoengineering. There has been
not-insignificant private sector interest in ocean fertilization thus far,3 05 and
Bill Gates is currently providing $1.5 million per year to study geoengineer-
ing options.306 Furthermore, without an appropriate forum to facilitate
debate and discussion, the relationship between geoengineering and other
mitigation or adaptation mechanisms remains unclear. While no state and
few commentators advocate geoengineering as the sole solution to climate
change, these technologies arguably present a moral hazard; simply know-
ing that they are available may cause states and individuals to abandon the
costly but necessary emissions reductions required to reduce atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases. Finally, the cumulative environmental
and political risks associated with geoengineering technologies are poten-
tially on a scale akin to nuclear disaster. Without an appropriate forum to
consider these options collectively, in the context of mitigation and adap-
tation more generally, the international community risks unleashing a
twenty-first century version of the Legend of Phaethon.
304. Victor, supra note 52, at 324. Not all commentators see this as a particular risk.
Joshua Horton argues that the risk of unilateral deployment of geoengineering technologies is
in fact a myth because the collective constraints on deployment are likely to operate as an ef-
fective deterrent. See Joshua B. Horton, Geoengineering and the Myth of Unilateralism:
Pressures and Prospects for International Cooperation, 4 STAN. J.L. Sci. & POL'Y 56, 59(2011).
305. KINTISCH, supra note 12, at 129. Climos, Planktos Science, the Ocean Nourishment
Corporation, and Atmocean are companies that have, to varying degrees, initiated and partici-
pated in ocean fertilization activities over the last decade. For an entertaining description of
the activities of Climos and Planktos, see id.; see also Margaret Leinen, Building Relation-
ships Between Scientists and Business in Ocean Iron Fertilization, 364 MARINE ECOLOGY
PROGREsS SERIES 251, 252-54 (2008); Aaron L. Strong et al., Ocean Fertilization: Science,
Policy and Commerce, 22 OCEANOGRAPHY 236, 237-38, 246-47 (2009).
306. KINTISCH, supra note 12, at 8-9.
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In light of the particular challenges posed by geoengineering, self-
regulation-whether through an active collaborative research program"o or
through the convening of a scientific conference designed to develop suita-
ble principles of govemance 308-does not represent an appropriate
governance mechanism. While there is some scope for institutional collabo-
ration between existing regimes and international bodies with respect to
geoengineering, 30 the creation of a designated forum for debate and regula-
tory development with respect to all geoengineering technologies is
arguably the most apposite regulatory solution. However, although a stand-
alone designated treaty is prima facie an attractive option, the segregation of
geoengineering from climate change mitigation and adaptation more gener-
ally is undesirable.
This article advocates the adoption of a geoengineering protocol to the
1992 JNFCCC.31 0 Although the UNFCCC has, to date, focused on the miti-
gation-adaptation paradigm,"' the climate change framework undoubtedly
provides the most appropriate forum from which to debate geoengineering
within the context of other responses to climate change such as emissions
reductions and adaptation. The 1992 UNFCCC itself has near-universal
support and benefits from a policy-making forum (the conference of the par-
ties) as well as associated scientific, technical, and financial bodies. 3 12 This
307. Precedents for such a research program include the European Organization for Nu-
clear Research, the Human Genome Project, and InterRidge, a nonprofit organization
established to promote the study, use, and protection of midocean ridges. This (non)regulatory
framework is advocated by Victor, supra note 52, at 325; cf Barrett, supra note 80, at 53. It
should be noted that the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI) was
launched by the Royal Society, the Academy of Sciences for the Developing World, and the
Environmental Defense Fund following the issue of the Royal Society report on geoengineer-
ing in 2009. The goal of SRMGI is to produce a clear set of recommendations for the
governance of SRM research. See SRMGI, SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT: THE GOVERN-
ANCE OF RESEARCH 11-13 (2011), available at http://www.srmgi.org/files/2012/
O/DES2391_SRMGI-report web_11112.pdf; see also Richard Elliot Benedick, Considera-
tions on Governance for Climate Remediation Technologies: Lessons from the "Ozone Hole,"
4 STAN. J.L. Sci. & PoL'Y 6, 8 (2011) (advocating the creation of a Climate Remediation Poli-
cy Council consisting of scientists, policy makers, and representatives of civil society from
twenty-five countries).
308. The Asilomar International Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies was
convened in California in 2009 with the purpose of developing principles relevant to geoengi-
neering governance. See Margaret Leinen, The Asilomar International Conference on Climate
Intervention Technologies: Background and Overview, 4 STAN. J.L. Sc. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2011).
309. I have explored the option of informal and formal institutional and regime collabo-
ration with respect to geoengineering elsewhere. See Karen N. Scott, Transboundary
Environmental Governance and Emerging Transboundary Threats: Geoengineering in the
Marine Environment, in TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE OF INLAND
COASTAL AND MARINE AREAS (Simon Marsden & Robin Warner eds., 2012).
310. Albert C. Lin also favors the adoption of a protocol to the UNFCCC, although one
that is rather differently constructed than the proposal in this Article. See Albert C. Lin, Ge-
oengineering Governance, 8 ISSUEs LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 3 (2009).
311. Virgoe, supra note 162, at 113.
312. See 1992 UNFCCC, supra note 32, arts. 9, 11, 24.
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Article recommends that the geoengineering protocol be structured as a
framework instrument, designed to set out general principles and policies
applicable to all geoengineering technologies and techniques. Principles
might include the following: a statement on when (if at all) geoengineering
can be considered appropriate for deployment as a climate change mitiga-
tion measure; an articulation of acceptable and unacceptable environmental
risks; the precautionary approach; principles relating to cooperation, infor-
mation exchange, scientific research, and environmental impact assessment;
principles setting out the relationship between geoengineering and climate
change mitigation and adaptation more generally; and principles relating to
state responsibility and individual liability for damage to the environment
and the global commons as a result of geoengineering activities. Where ge-
oengineering activities are authorized in principle, it is highly likely that
other bodies such as the International Maritime Organization or the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space are better placed than the
geoengineering protocol conference of parties to develop detailed regula-
tions designed to protect the environment and the rights of all states. This
Article recommends that the task of developing detailed regulations be de-
volved to the appropriate body, taking into consideration the principles,
definitions, and other constraints provided for in the geoengineering proto-
col. This proposal 313 therefore acknowledges and draws on the expertise
developed within a number of international and regional bodies with respect
to environmental protection but also provides an overall policy and ethical
framework within which that expertise should be exercised.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Geoengineering constitutes a critical threat to the environment-directly
through intended and unintended impacts resulting from the manipulation of
the atmosphere, biosphere, and oceans, and indirectly as a consequence of di-
verting attention and resources from emissions reductions and other measures
designed to mitigate and adapt to climate change. As such, geoengineering
also poses a regulatory challenge for international environmental law. More
significantly, however, geoengineering is symbolic of a much greater chal-
lenge to the international community: the Anthropocene. The traditional
distinction between humankind and nature and the characterization of the
latter as something outside of, or other than, the human sphere no longer ac-
curately reflects the relationship between humankind and the environment in
313. This proposal was developed in a paper presented at the 2011 International Scien-
tific Conference on Problems of Adaptation to Climate Change, sponsored by the Russian
Academy of Sciences together with the World Meteorological Organization, U.N. Environ-
ment Program, and U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. See KAREN N.
SCOTT, THE LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GEOENGINEERING: AN EVALUATION (paper
presented at the 2011 International Scientific Conference on Problems of Adaptation to Cli-
mate Change, Moscow, Rus., Nov. 7-9, 2011) (on file with author). This proposal was noted
in the final report of the conference. See Frolov, supra note 150.
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the Anthropocene. For lawyers and policy makers, the vital question is
whether international environmental law is capable of responding to the in-
tegrated composites of "human" and "natural" in the Anthropocene.3 14
Geoengineering provides an ideal case study to evaluate the scope,
extent, and indeed the limits of international environmental law in the
Anthropocene. No longer merely the descriptor of a substantive area of
international regulation, international environmental law can be said to
consist of the norms and principles generally applicable to activities that
pose a risk of significant harm to the transboundary or commons
environment. The core of these principles comprise prevention of harm;
prevention of pollution; protection of vulnerable ecosystems and species;
precaution; cooperation, information exchange, and environmental impact
assessment; due regard for other states and users; and state responsibility for
environmental harm. Other principles such as sustainable development may
be added as the discipline matures. This normative core is supplemented and
enhanced by detailed obligations that are applicable to particular activities
or types of impacts and that are generally found within treaty regimes
developed by states. The integration of human and nature that characterizes
the Anthropocene has implicitly been recognized by the application of the
core principles of international environmental law to all activities likely to
have a significant impact on the environment, rather than just those activities
subject to particular negotiated rules or individual treaty regimes.
Nevertheless, as the case study on geoengineering demonstrates, inter-
national environmental law as a discipline has inherent limits. Many of
those limits result from significant differences among states in their cultural
attitudes toward the environment, risk assessment, and climate change in
particular, and, consequently, divergent interpretations of key definitions and
thresholds of harm. In the particular case of geoengineering, this Article ad-
vocates a regulatory solution that establishes a forum under the 1992
UNFCCC within which fundamental ethical, legal, and policy questions can
be debated and the relationship between geoengineering and other responses
to climate change can be explored. However, a crucial component of this
proposal seeks to develop close connections between the 1992 UNFCCC
and other bodies and regimes of relevance to geoengineering-and climate
change more generally-in order to develop a coherent, consistent, and, im-
portantly, a preemptive response to geoengineering. Recognizing and
exploiting the connections and intersection between environmental and oth-
er regimes is arguably central to the development of international
environmental law in the Anthropocene.
In recognizing the Anthropocene as a new geological era, we have implic-
itly accepted the overwhelming impact that humankind has had, and continues
to exert, on planet Earth. Responding to this impact constitutes one of the
greatest challenges for international law. However, within a relatively short
period of time, international environmental law has emerged as a coherent
314. See Allenby, supra note 46, at 110.
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discipline comprising core principles and norms developed to protect the
transboundary and commons environment. By no means entirely success-
ful-as demonstrated by the climate change regime itself-international
environmental law nevertheless is growing in potency as a mechanism to
constrain the actions of states. Geoengineering-the ultimate poster child
of the Anthropocene-undoubtedly represents the next great challenge for
international environmental law.
